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ABSTRACT
The Islamic Resistance Movement, also known as Hamas, has been in

existence for a quarter of a century. In that time, it has grown from a seemingly
insignificant resistance movement against Israeli occupation of the Palestinian

Territories to a major political party that challenges the socio-political legitimacy

of the Palestine Liberation Organization. This research attempts to discover how

Hamas has changed its strategic messaging during its 25-year existence, in
order to gain a greater understanding of what motivates the movement, as well
as those who support it. Employing qualified and quantified content and frame
I

analysis, this research examines a collection of translated Hamas documents,
I

■

ranging from its creation during the First Intifada of 1988 to the 2006 Palestinian
Legislative elections. This analysis shows that the movement has pragmatically
J

altered its messaging to meet its changing needs and changing audiences. By
!

understanding the nature of these changes, and how they influence Hamas and
its supporters, we gain a greater understanding of the complexities that make up
I

the greater Palestinian-Israeli Conflict.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Socio-political movements have a variety of tools with which to acquire

and maintain their human resources. Some may take advantage ofthe
coalescing qualities brought by a charismatic figurehead. Others may opt to

encourage membership and support by developing extensive socio-political

programs and institutions. Whatever tactics or strategies a movement employs

to gain popularity with the masses, it must get its message out to the people it is
trying to attract to its cause. If a movement fails to attract and maintain human

resources, it fails to exist. A very effective vehicle used to deliver messages is
collective action frames. Collective action frames carry information and ideas

from social movements to their potential and existing human resources; they

align themes in ways that resonates with likeminded individuals, making them a
human resource through their direct membership, support or ideological

sympathy; they tell people how to think about an issue, as well as what to do

about it. Some of the most proficient uses of collective action frames come from
the Islamic Resistance Movement, better known as Hamas. Throughout its

twenty-five-year history, Hamas has successfully employed the various

mechanisms and processes of collective action framing, enabling the group to
grow from a small, unknown resistance movement in the late 1980s to a major
political party in 2006. But what exactly are those mechanisms and processes,
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and how exactly has Hamas used them in specific documents to acquire and
maintain its human resources? The answer to these questions is the focus of
this study.

Organization of the Study

This research is divided into seven chapters intended to expose readers to

a variety of relevant social science concepts and historical perspectives so that
they can better understand the conclusions upon which those concepts and

perspectives are based. The INTRODUCTION outlines the layout of the study,
and explains its purpose, limitations and definitions of key terms. CHAPTER
TWO offers an assessment of literature on collective action frames and Hamas,
in order to expose the distinct academic holes in research that this study helps to

fill. CHAPTER THREE describes case study research and the particular case
used in this study, the qualitative and quantitative research methods used in this

research, and the ways content and frame analysis have been scientifically used

to examine data and form conclusions in this research. CHAPTER FOUR
explains, in detail, the concept of collective action framing, including its

theoretical foundation, components, alignment, and resonance. CHAPTER FIVE
describes the ideologies and history of Hamas, in order for readers to gain an
understanding of this complex movement and to give context to the documents

and conclusions that follow. CHAPTER SIX features a detailed analysis of
several documents by Hamas, including its 1988 charter, various leaflets from
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the First Intifada, and its 2006 election manifesto. Finally, CHAPTER SEVEN

sums up the findings of this research and draws several conclusions regarding
how and why Hamas employs the types of framing it uses and how those frames

have changed overtime.

Purpose of the Study

The decision whether or not to take part in a social movement or collective

action is not made in a vacuum. Many factors, certainly, both conscious and
subconscious, go into such a choice. The purpose of this study is to help
researchers and scholars of contentious politics and social movement theory to

gain a greater understanding of the role frames play in that decision by showing
the ways social movement entrepreneurs use them to acquire, maintain, and
motivate human resources for the purpose of collective action. The case study of

Hamas and a comparison of the framing mechanisms and processes used in its
1988 charter, its First Intifada leaflets, and its 2006 electoral platform furthers the

discussion on collective action framing and adds to the evidence that frames can

resonate with target audiences and help to motivate collective action. Such
research also gives a greater academic understanding of the complexities of the

Hamas movement and those who—for whatever reason—identify with it. When
I

considering the size, influence, and longevity of Hamas, the need for such an
understanding is absolutely warranted and could be vital to attempts at peace in
I

the region of Israel and Palestine.
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Limitations of the Study

There are a number of limitations regarding the theories, case study, and
documents used in this study. One such limitation is that of offering significant

and verifiable proof of the concept of frame resonance. While there is certainly a
great deal of evidence to suggest that frame resonance operates exactly how it is

articulated in Chapter Four of this research, the fact is that we do not know that it

does with any amount of certainty. Until more research is done that finds a way
to accurately measure what a person or a target audience thinks about what they
read and hear, and, perhaps more importantly, measures how people act upon
i

what they read and hear, the process of frame resonance, and the mechanisms

that drive it will remain an unverified theory.

Another such limitation of this study is the lack of verifiable data on the
movement Hamas. While Hamas is certainly a socio-political movement, it is
also a resistance movement—one that has been violent and regarded by many

as terrorist in nature. As such, there is a lot that is not known about the members

of the group or about its inner workings, and what we do know is often presented
with a biased slant. These factors are important for a couple of important

reasons. First, reliable information on the membership numbers of Hamas over

time could help with quantifiable evidence that Hamas’s framing tactics resonate
with the target population. Second, unbiased academic research on Hamas

could help with qualifiable evidence regarding the motivations for its actions and
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positions, which, ultimately affects what we know about its public image and, in
turn, its degree of frame resonance.

A third set of limitations rest in the documents being analyzed in this

study. First, access to the Hamas documents analyzed in this study, especially

its First Intifada leaflets is largely limited to what has been translated and

published by other authors. This presents multiple potential problems that
include context and meaning of words and phrases being lost in translation and

potential bias by the translator affecting their translations. Another limitation and
potential problem is that of presupposition in analyzing the documents. This
author has made a great attempt to exclude personal feelings about the case

study from the content and frame analysis, but must recognize that it is possible
that some bias still exists. Those attempting to recreate this study will also need

to be on guard against their own presuppositions'and biases regarding the case
study and document analyses, while also recognizing that those qualities may

still find their way into the researcher’s work.

Definitions

Socio-Political Movement or Terrorists?
Socio-political movements provide people with a way for their grievances

to be heard and to take collective action in attempt to resolve those grievances.
For the purposes of this study, a socio-political movement is regarded as a

movement that attempts to bring both social and political change through various
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means that may or may not include violence. This definition is in line with
seminal and current academic literature. In Power in Movement, sociologist
Sidney Tarrow describes a social movement as a group whose “actions are

based on dense social networks and effective connective structures and draw on

legitimate, action-oriented cultural frames,” with the ability to “sustain these
actions even in contact with powerful opponents” (Tarrow, 2011, p. 16).

Contentious politics is often an important facet of a social movement. In

his dissertation, entitled “Guerrillas today, what tomorrow: transformation of
guerrilla movements,” political violence scholar, Kevin Grisham, describes
I

contentious politics as forms of collective political'behavior by political contenders

against a particular government (Grisham, 2009), Sociologist Charles Tilly
I

defines collective action as “people’s [s/c] acting together in pursuit of common

interests” (Tilly, 1978, p. 7).
When collective action includes physical force, it becomes collective
violence. Tilly opines that collective violence displays the proof that at least
some of the people involved in a collective action are taking the action seriously,
and that it brings the collective action, and in turn, the movement behind that
action, to the attention of others (Tilly, 1978). However, once attention to the

movement and its violent action is drawn, people begin to form opinions about
both based on their own individual needs and value systems. Some may see the
violent actions as acceptable means by a legitimate movement in an effort to
bring about an eventual end, while others may see them as intolerable acts of
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force by illegal and immoral terrorists. This subjective gray area makes the term

“terrorist” problematic to objective academia, and, as such, will be used sparingly
when describing the case study of Hamas.
Mechanisms and Processes

This study employs the mechanism-and-process approach in regards to

the concept of collective action framing. The mechanism-and-process approach
is the method utilized by McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001) in their

groundbreaking Dynamics of Contention, in which they analyze small-scale
causal mechanisms that combine to produce and affect larger processes (p. 24;
I

Tarrow, 2011, p. 185). As George and Bennet (as cited in Tarrow, 2011, pp.
185-186) explain, “students of mechanisms and processes are less interested in

the ‘why’ of contentious politics than in its ‘how,’” putting them “closer to the
strong advocates of ‘process tracing’... than to traditional variable-based
analysis.” With that stated, however, this study focuses on both how and why

Hamas uses and alters its collective action framing mechanisms and processes.
Mechanisms. McAdam, et al. (2001, p. 24) define mechanisms as “a

delimited class of events that alter relations among specified sets of elements in
identical or similar ways over a variety of situations.” In simpler terms,

mechanisms are specifically defined events that combine with each other to

change other specified variables that lead to relatively predictable outcomes in a
variety of situations. Hedstrom and Swedberg (as cited in McAdam, et al., 2001,
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p. 25) claim that the study of mechanisms linking variables “has become the
stock in trade of quantitative social science and causal modeling.”
There are three types of mechanisms as defined by McAdam, et al. First,

environmental mechanisms are “externally generated influences on conditions
affecting social life” (McAdam et al., 2001, p. 25). Examples of environmental
mechanisms include the real life problems that affect real people and the ways

they receive and interpret frames, as detailed in Chapter Four. Next, “cognitive
mechanisms operate through alterations of individual and collective perception...”

(McAdam et al., 2001, p. 26). Examples of cognitive mechanisms include any

collective action frame that changes the way people perceive a problem or
solution to that problem, as articulated in Chapter, Four. Finally, “relational
mechanisms alter connections among people, groups, and interpersonal

networks" (McAdam et al., 2001, p. 26). Examples of relational mechanisms
include frame extension and frame transformation and are further articulated in

Chapter Four of this research.
Processes. Mechanisms combine in various combinations to form

processes, which McAdam and others (McAdam et al., 2001, pp. 24, 27) define
as “regular sequences of such mechanisms that produce similar generally more
complex and contingent) transformations of those elements.” It is important to

note that mechanisms aggregate to form processes, but that those processes

can also be considered as mechanisms of greater processes. For example,
various mechanisms of communication come together to form the process of
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diffusion. In turn, mechanisms of diffusion combine with mechanisms of relativity

and credibility to form the process of frame resonance. Meanwhile, the
mechanism of frame resonance combines with identity and agency mechanisms

to form the overall framing process. The concepts of frame resonance, identity,
agency, and other mechanisms and processes of framing are further articulated

in Chapter Fourof this research.
Human Resources

For the purposes of this research, it is important to have clear definitions
for the multiple facets that combine to make up what will be referred to as

“human resources.”

Members (M)

True
Believers
(TB)

I

|

Pragmatic
Members
(PM)

Supporters
(Si)

Sympathizers
(S2)

HR=M+S1+S2
M=TB+PM

Figure 1. Aggregate of Human Resources (HR)

As explained by Grisham1, human resources are “essential for the staying power
of the movement” (Grisham, 2009, p. 83). Human resources are the aggregate

1 Resource mobilization theories generally regard resources as material in nature, and regard
collections of people as organizations rather than resources. On that same note, organizational
theories and theories of human capacity tend to focus primarily on organizations that are not
socio-political in nature. Grisham’s human resource classifications are both simple and elegant,
while fitting within the socio-political scope of this research. It is for these reasons that they are
the classifications used.
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of the members, supporters, and sympathizers of a movement, as displayed in
Figure 1. While socio-political movements must often make due with whatever

limited material resources they can acquire, they cannot survive without
continuously acquiring and maintaining human resources. Political scientist
Harry Eckstein agrees, writing that, without popular support, a contentious

movement has little chance of success (Eckstein, 1965).
Members. Members are the most important facet of human resources.

Members are the current members of the movement, including rank-and-file and

leadership members. Whether it is gathering in protest, taking part in acts of
I
I

collective violence, or organizing such activities, movement members are the
people who actively take part in the collective actions of the movement. While
extremely difficult, it is arguably possible for a socio-political movement to exist
without the presence of other human resource categories. The same cannot be

said of movement members. Simply put, a movement cannot exist without
members.
Depending on the particular socio-political movement, membership may

not always be readily apparent to those on the outside. For example,

movements that are perceived by some to be terrorists, such as Hamas, may not
be as willing to disclose the identity of its members as movements that use more
universally acceptable forms of collective action. Likewise, the members of

violent socio-political movements may not be as willing to disclose their own

membership in the group as members of a peaceful movement may.
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Members of a socio-political movement are classified into one of two

categories: true believers or pragmatic members. Kevin Grisham defines true
believers as members ofthe movement who are unwilling to compromise on the

original beliefs and ideals ofthe movement. Grisham explains that their
uncompromising positions make true believers less likely to create or react
favorably to themes or frames that greatly differ from the original ideologies ofthe
I

movement (Grisham, 2009). In contrast to the hard-line positions of true
believers are pragmatic members. Pragmatic members view compromise as

necessary means of survival for the movement. Grisham further explains that
opportunities of “political accessibility” often arise during the natural cycle of a
movement. When such opportunities are recognized, pragmatic members are
more willing to alter the movement’s themes, frames, and ideologies to meet the

new opportunities and challenges that have been created (Grisham, 2009, p. 78-

80).
Supporters. Another facet of human resources is supporters. Supporters

are not actual members ofthe movement. They do not take an active role in the
collective actions of the movement in the same way as the movement’s members

do. Rather, supporters act as boosters for the movement, providing it with vital

material resources and general assistance. For example, while movement
members may gather at a particular location in protest of a particular issue, a

movement supporter might be the person, such as the property owner or
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manager, who has given authorization for the movement to gather at that location

(Grisham, 2009). Direct general assistance also includes voting in favor of the

movement, as well as for or against things that directly aid in the group’s short- or
long-term goals.
Sympathizers. Sympathizers of a socio-political movement are not

members or supporters of the movement They do not provide direct assistance

to the movement; they do not provide material resources to the movement; they
do not directly participate in the activities of the movement. However,

sympathizers play a crucial role in the life of a socio-political movement.

Sympathizers act as a human resource to a group giving the group direct and
indirect moral support and authority (Grisham, 2009). Sympathizers provide
I

direct moral support to a movement through actions such as displaying its

recognizable flag or emblem in public. Indirect moral support is more subtle, and
comes in the form of inactions such as not complaining about a neighbor

displaying a movement’s flag or emblem, not complaining about a noisy protest,

or not exposing members of a movement.
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CHAPTER TWO
ASSESSMENT OF LITERATURE

The idea of frames and framing began taking shape in the 1960s and 70s.

The early research and theories developed by these pioneers paved the way for

more extensive and elaborate research and theoretical concepts on these topics
in the 1980s. Just as research on framing processes and mechanisms was
ramping up in the ‘80s, so was a little-known socio-political movement that called
i.

itself the Islamic Resistance Movement, or Hamas. From its 1988 introduction to
collective action at the beginning of the first Palestinian Intifada to its introduction
into the political arena in the 2006 election of the Palestinian Legislative Council,

Hamas has proven its proficiency in the mechanics of collective action framing.
Yet, while the study of collective action frames and framing has continued to
progress at a relatively steady pace, the study of how Hamas uses this
mobilization method has not

Literature on Frames and Framing

While the intricacies of frames and framing are articulated in the
subsequent chapter of this research, a brief examination of the concept is helpful

in gaining an understanding of how scholars and authors have—and have not—

given attention to those concepts when covering the Hamas movement. Much of
the academic discussion on frames and framing began in 1974 with Erving
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Goffman’s Frame Analysis. Goffman (1974) writes that, in order to explain the
ever-present question, “what is going on here?,” people break up their individual

experiences into “strips” of reality that are based on and organized by a set of
social principles he defines as “frames” (pp. 8-10). These primary frameworks
can be social in nature, and can “incorporate the will, aim, and controlling effort

on an intelligence, a live agency, the chief one being the human being” (Goffman,

1974, p. 22). Social frameworks, as Goffman (1974) explains, set up “guided
I

doings,” that are influenced by the social norms and values of those giving and

receiving the controlling effort (p. 22).
After Goffman published his groundbreaking work in 1974, social
scientists soon began expanding on the concepts of frames and framing, turning

them from a relatively passive act involved in person-to-person communication to
a more intentional and motivated act between social movement entrepreneurs

and audiences. Theorists Robert D. Benford, David A. Snow, and William

Gamson were, and continue to be especially prolific in the study of what became
known as collective action frames and framing. Approaching the idea from the
perspective of an audience, Gamson published Encounters with Unjust Authority
in 1982, wherein he theorized that frames could be used as a motivating factor
for people to join a collective action. In contrast to Gamson’s audience
perspective, Benford and Snow published an article entitled Ideology, Frame

Resonance, and Participant Mobilization in 1988, wherein they articulated
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elaborate concepts of strategic framing that would help a message resonate with
a target audience.

Following the 1980s works of Benford, Snow, and Gamson, social

scientists of the 1990s and 21st century began applying theories of collective
action frames and strategic framing to their own theories of movement
mobilization and contentious politics. Theorists, such as Bert Klandermans,
Mayer N. Zald, and others wrote numerous case study articles describing the use

of frames by the media, government, and social movements in order to sway

public opinion on a particular issue. Hamas, however, was not one of the cases
they examined. Meanwhile, theorists, such as Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow,
and Charles Tilly were applying the use of frames to their groundbreaking models

on the dynamic mechanisms and processes of contentious politics and collective
action. And scholars, such as Hank Johnston and John A. Noakes, among many

others, continue the discussion on the use of collective action frames as a

mobilizing factor in the relationship between social movements and their target

audiences.

Literature on Hamas

There has been no shortage of literature on Hamas since its introduction

to the world in the late 1980s. To their credit, historians, journalists and experts
in the field of terrorism and violent movements have been relatively prolific on the

topic, continuing to update what we know about Hamas. A vast majority of the
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early literature on Hamas, however, was not analytical in nature, but rather,
highly descriptive histories, with each attempting to detail what the authors
believe to be the true history of the group.
While some authors opted to take only initial steps in their coverage of
Hamas, writing detailed or not-so-detailed histories, others chose to go further in

depth. In 1994, during the relative lull between the First and Second Intifadas,
Shaul Misha I, co-author of The Palestinian Hamas, teamed up with Middle East

expert Reuben Aharoni to publish Speaking Stones: Communiques from the
Intifada Underground. In Speaking Stones, Mishal and Aharoni give historic

context and critical content analysis to several publically distributed handbills
from two Palestinian factions, including Hamas. The authors review the
handbills, which are included and translated for the reader, for directive themes
from the movements that produced them to the public that received them. Those

themes are then quantified and somewhat qualified by the authors through
content analysis.
Unfortunately, few authors followed the mixed method approach to the

topic of Hamas taken by Mishal and Aharoni. From 2006 to the present, much of
the works on Hamas have provided, at best, qualified content analysis, ignoring

any quantified support of their findings and claims. For example, in 2006, author
Khaled Hroub published Hamas: A Beginners Guide, wherein he posed

questions about the movement and then answered those questions with
considerable support from Hamas texts and statements. That same year, Hroub
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published analytical work on Hamas and its use of communications. Hroub’s
article, “A ‘New Hamas’ and its Documents," was published in a 2006 edition of
the Journal of Palestinian Studies. In it, the author performs content analysis on
Hamas’s 2006 electoral platform, its draft proposal for a Hamas/Fatah coalition
government, and its proposed cabinet platform following its victory in the 2006

Palestinian legislative election. Interestingly, Hroub’s content analysis starkly

differs from that of Mishal’s, in that Hroub does not include a quantified analysis,
choosing to stick purely to an interpretative analysis of themes that the author
argues show pragmatism on the part of Hamas, while still maintaining its core
values. The following year, author Zaki Chehab published Inside Hamas: The

Untold Story of the Islamic Militant Movement. Chehab takes a different
approach that that of Hroub, offering the reader insights from Hamas leaders

drawn from interviews with the author.

Since 2006, claims regarding the 1988 charter of Hamas have become
much more prominent in literature on the group. In 2007, author Azzam Tamimi

published Hamas: A History from Within. Tamimi somewhat combines the
formats of Hroub and Chehab, drawing his claims from various Hamas texts and

interviews that the author conducted with Hamas members. One of the main

documents discussed throughout Tamimi’s book is the Hamas charter, which is

also featured as an English translation its appendices.

In 2009, journalist Paola

Caridi published Hamas: From Resistance to Government wherein the author
draws heavily from the works of other authors who analyzed documents and
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conducted interviews to launch a seemingly biased attempt to excuse the
charter. And in 2012, authors Beverly Milton-Edwards and Stephen Farrell

published Hamas; a largely unbiased look at the movement that also draws

heavily on content analysis to support positions the authors take regarding the
movement’s history, ideologies, and motivations.
While there has been a good deal of coverage regarding the content of

Hamas’s documents, there has been little research done in regards to its use of
frames in those documents. One marked exception is from framing expert Joas

Wagemakers. In 2010, Wagemakers published his article, “Legitimizing

Pragmatism: Hamas’s Framing Efforts From Militancy to Modernization and
Back?" In his analysis that specifically looks at Hamas material with a

perspective grounded in the mechanisms and processes of collective action
framing, Wagemakers examines a variety of texts and speeches by Hamas put
out over the history of the movement. Wagemakers’ analysis finds particular
themes in the Hamas communications, upon which the group creates frames to

attract people, and helps to provide a solid foundation by which to further
examine the framing efforts of Hamas. Wagemakers, however, like the vast

majority of authors and researchers before him, does not support his qualified

frame and content analysis with quantified research.

Conclusion
The pace of academic research on Hamas’s framing mechanisms and
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processes has not kept up with that of the more generalized attention given to

the movement’s history and textual content. If we are to gain a complete
understanding of this complex movement, we must begin to gain an
understanding of the motivations it, and its potential and existing human

resources have. Such an understanding is achieved through mixed-method
analysis of what Hamas says and attempting to decipher why it says it, as well as

by studying why its messaging seems to resonate with so many people for such

a long period of time.
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CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGIES

This research employs a mixed-methods strategy that combines

qualitative and quantitative content and frame analysis to the case study of the
socio-political movement known as Hamas in order to answer the proposed
question regarding the group’s use of collective action framing mechanisms and
processes for the purpose of attracting and maintaining potential and existing

human resources.

Case Study Research

According to Leonard Cargan (2007, p. 204), case study research is a

“strategy that focuses on the behavior, history, social context, and treatment of

one organization at one defined point in time or on a small number of individual
cases that have features in common” in order “to either explain or describe in-

depth and in-detail the characteristics of a single unit.” This research method
often involves gathering data through the analysis of documents, interviews of

individuals, and observation of organizations. Such a strategy has both
advantages and disadvantages to it. Perhaps the greatest advantage is that, by
studying a single unit, researchers are able to gain detailed information on a
particular organization. By contrast, perhaps the greatest disadvantage is that,
by studying a single unit, research findings are not always able to be applied to
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other organizations (Cargan, 2007, p. 204). Regardless of such a disadvantage,
however, case study research “can be useful in generating theories or for

developing tentative conclusions, so it is appropriate for descriptive or
exploratory studies” (Cargan, 2007, p. 204).

Why Hamas?
The case study in this research is the Islamic Resistance Movement;

better known to the world as Hamas. Hamas is a highly complex Palestinian

socio-political movement that is loved and loathed throughout the world. Its

members are seen as terrorists and freedom fighters by the movement’s
respective opponents and supporters. This dichotomy makes Hamas a

particularly interesting case study for research investigating various forms and

facets of resource mobilization and social movement theory. The fact that
Hamas has managed to exist for nearly 25 years, and does not appear to be
going away any time soon, only increases the need to gain a complete and

unbiased understanding of the movement, as well as an understanding of what
motivates those who are a part of its potential and existing human resources.
Hamas has a wide variety of controversial documents that have been the

subject of largely biased analyses which were seemingly motivated by the desire
to either demonize or apologize for the movement. In order to discover a greater,
unbiased picture of Hamas, the focus of this research is to compare and contrast

many of those documents as a collection in order to discover how they do or do
not relate to each other in the context of human resource mobilization and
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collective action framing. As such, the relatively large collection of documents
and the level of analysis going into them did not allow for other cases to fit within

the scope of this research. Of course, as mentioned above, the findings of this
research based on a single case study cannot be applied across the board to
every socio-political movement. With that stated, however, the theories from

which it draws and supports can be applied to the framing tactics of many social

movement entrepreneurs, as well as to the motivations of human resources to
join a particular movement. Obvious examples include, but are certainly not
limited to Hamas’s primary Palestinian rival, Fatah, as well as fellow Islamic

nationalists, Hezbollah.

Methods

The purpose of this research is to investigate the use of collective action
framing mechanisms and processes by Hamas in order to acquire and maintain

potential and existing human resources. The methods used combine content
and frame analysis with qualified and quantified analyses. An assorted collection

of documents from Hamas have been analyzed using these methods and the
results of that analysis have been qualified in order to give their contents context,
as well as quantified to lend numerical support to the qualified contextual

findings.
Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis

Qualitative data “refer[s] to the characteristics, concepts, definitions,
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descriptions, metaphors, and symbols of things and events” and consists of

mainly “written or spoken words” (Cargan, 2007, p. 9). By contrast, quantitative
data consists of “counts and measures of items, or the quantitative rendering of
social phenomena” (Cargan, 2007, p. 9). Each of these methods of analysis can

be utilized independently of the other, or can be used in conjunction with one
another. As explained by Cargan (2007, p. 10):

Studies that collect primarily quantitative data may also include items
requiring written responses that will be used in qualitative analysis in order

to uncover unexpected patterns... Similarly, it may be necessary to
convert some of the qualitative data into quantitative data to add numerical

backing for claims.
Krippendorff (2004, pp. 19-20, 87) echoes this sentiment, citing that both

methods have proven their usefulness in the field of content analysis, and that,

“for the analysis of texts, both are indispensable.”
Content and Frame Analyses
Content analysis, as defined by Klaus Krippendorff (2004), “is a research
technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other

meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use” (p. 18). Krippendorff s framework
for performing content analysis begins with an individual body of text to be

analyzed. Next, the researcher must formulate a research question to be
answered by analyzing that particular text. Following this, the researcher must
recognize the context of the text being analyzed and form “an analytical construct
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that operationalizes what the analyst knows about the context” (Krippendorff,
2004, p. 30). In the event there are missing or unidentified contexts within the

text, the researcher must then make abductive inferences about those missing

pieces. For example, “one might infer the religious affiliations of political leaders
from the metaphors used in their speeches” (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 37). Finally,

the researcher validates his or her evidence and inferences by creating a

research construct that can be reproduced by others wishing to test the findings
and the support of other primary and secondary sources on the topic of the text
or context in question. Krippendorff (2004) cites this framework as being able to

“handle unstructured matter as data,” as well as “cope with large volumes of
data” in a way that is “context sensitive” (pp. 41-42).

Similar to content analysis is the method of frame analysis. As described

by Jim A. Kuypers (2009), frame analysis takes many ofthe qualities of content
analysis, but applies them to the discovery and interpretation of frames and

framing themes. Kuypers (2009) uses frame analysis to “detect frames” by

looking “for key words, metaphors, concepts, symbols, and visual images” (p.
191). He first examines a speech or text “to find the main themes” (Kuypers,
2009, p. 191). The presence of a theme signifies the presence of a frame, so he

then examines the speech or text to “determine how these themes are framed by

looking for key words, concepts, labels (names), metaphors, and phrases that
help contextualize remarks” (Kuypers, 2009, p. 191). Finally, Kuypers compares
his findings against other sources of framed information—in his case, the
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mainstream print press—to see if the original themes are present or not He then
draws his conclusions based on those comparisons. Kuypers points out the

advantages as well as risks inherent with using frame analysis. He states that

the research method “is especially well-suited for comparative analyses” and that
those who employ it will find that “clear results are to be had” (Kuypers, 2009, p.

198). However, the author also warns that “careless critics often find what they
set out to find,” and that care must be taken to “examine the entire rhetorical
artifact before determining what frames are operating” (Kuypers, 2009, p. 198).

Sampling. The design of this research holds, largely, to the design

specifications of content and frame analysis listed above. The bodies of text, or

sampling units, used in this research are Hamas’s official 1988 charter, a
collection of 25 Hamas leaflets, ranging from 1988 through 1991 during the First
Intifada, and the official 2006 electoral platform from the Hamas-based List of

Change and Reform. The charter text that was analyzed was the 1990 English

translation by Muhammad Maqdsi for the Islamic Association for Palestine in
Dallas, Texas, and was published in the Journal for Palestine Studies XXII no. 4

edition. That same translation of the charter is also featured in Shaul Mishal and
Avraham Sela’s The Palestinian Hamas (2000, pp. 175-199). The Hamas
leaflets that were analyzed are the English translations featured in Shaul Mishal

and Reuben Aharoni’s Speaking stones: Communiques from the Intifada
underground (1994, pp. 201-285). And the List of Change and Reform electoral
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platform that was analyzed is the English translation of that text featured in
Azzam Tamimi’s Hamas: A history from within (2007, pp. 292-316).
The 1988 charter and 2006 election manifesto samples are thematic units

selected due to their official nature as officially recognized platforms of Hamas in

their respective periods. Due to the limited availability of original or reprinted
leaflets from the First Intifada, the leaflet samples are convenience samples

provided as part of a published collection that did not include all of Hamas’s
leaflets from that period. Mishal and Aharoni offer a total of 25 leaflets by

Hamas. They are not in complete sequential order, nor are they equally

weighted year-to-year. Due to this deficiency in sourcing, analysis of the leaflets

is incomplete and the conclusions drawn from them are imperfect. While they

were not all referenced, all 25 were the subject of analysis in this study, making
the conclusions drawn from them as valid as relatively possible.

Coding. Coding in content and frame analysis is a highly-interpretive

process by which analysts “interpret what they see, read, or find and then state
I

their experiences in the formal terms of analysis...' according to observer
independent rules” (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 126). As such, coders must be able to

identify, not only specific terms, but also contexts and implications within a
sample that might not be easily identifiable or interpreted by those not familiar
with their frameworks. Such identification needs require content and frame

analysis coders to have proficient knowledge of the culture and potential intent, if
any, of those that produced the sample being studied, as well as proficient
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knowledge of the theoretical frameworks by which they are being analyzed

(Krippendorff, 2004, pp. 127-128). For example, it might be just as difficult for a

specialist in American history to code and analyze a translated Chinese
document as it could be for a Chinese specialist to code and analyze an

American document. Similarly, it would be potentially difficult for those with a
chemistry background to recognize the mechanisms and processes of

sociological frameworks found in a text, just as it would be potentially difficult for

a sociologist to identify the mechanisms and processes at work in a study of
atomic fusion.

In order to hold to Kuypers’ requirement that frame analysts allow texts to
speak forthemselves, rather than analysis beginning with preconceived notions

about what texts should or might contain, the coding process used in this
research began with complete readings of the sample texts. With those initial
readings, patterns, themes, and framing concepts in use were identified through

contextual qualitative interpretation. Once those items were individually

identified, repeated readings of the data samples were done in order to then
quantify their occurrences within the samples. Finally, the qualified and
quantified findings of those readings were interpreted into conclusions regarding

the collective action framing theories articulated in CHAPTER FIVE of this
research.

Reliability and Validity of Data. Reliability refers to “the extent to which a
process of measurement produces the same result if used repeatedly” (Cargan,
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2007, p. 318). On the other hand, validity refers to “an estimate of how well a

dependent variable measures what it is intended to measure” (Cargan, 2007, p.

319). The reliability and validity of data is an important factor of any research;
and, because of the necessary inferences and contextual interpretations involved

in content and frame analyses, these factors are of great concern (Smith, 1981,

p. 328). Content analysis is considered valid if the conclusions drawn from its
samples “withstand the test” of independent research, observation, or
interpretation (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 313). Unfortunately, it is, according to H. W.

Smith (1981, p. 329), “rare for researchers to obtain perfect reliability between
independent measurements,” and that fact “must be taken into account” by
researchers attempting to replicate a study.

This research draws heavily on face validity, which is defined by
Krippendorff (2004, p. 313) as validity that is “obvious,” or “common truth” that

simply “makes sense.” Krippendorff explains that “it makes sense, indeed, to
measure public attention to an issue by the relative frequency with which the
issue is mentioned.” Therefore, the same holds true for the frequency with which

particular words and ideas are mentioned. It is this form of “sense” that has gone

into this study’s measurement of collective action frame resonance. As a result,
those attempting to reproduce or test the findings of this research will have to

make sure they draw the same contextual inferences and use the same
theoretical “sense” as those made in the original study.
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CHAPTER FOUR
COLLECTIVE ACTION FRAMES

Socio-political movements provide people with a way for their grievances

to be heard and to take collective action in attempt to resolve those grievances.

And just as socio-political movements provide people with a way for their voices
to be heard, collective action frames provide the movement with a way for its

voice to be heard. Sociologists David Snow and Robert Benford (1992, p. 137) '

define a frame as an “interpretive schema that simplifies and condenses the
‘world out there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations,

events, experiences, and sequences of action” and depicting them to be
significant. Socio-political movements distribute framed ideas to receiving

audiences through framing mechanisms and processes designed to attract,
maintain, and mobilize their human resources. These mechanisms and
processes must arrange frames in a way that convince their target audience that

in injustice has taken place against it, identify who has committed that injustice,

and the specific actions that should be taken to correct the injustice (Noakes &
Johnston, 2005, p. 2). When successful, this motivational framing encourages
individuals to participate in the movement by attempting to influence their

decision-making processes (Gamson, 1992b).

This chapter defines, in detail, the mechanisms and processes involved in
collective action framing, and provides an assessment of literature by several
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distinguished social scientists on the topic. First, the basic concept of a frame is
described, showing how people use frames to define experiences. Next, the

chapter turns from basic frames to collective action frames; where they are
broken down to their base components in order to display the ways they are

strategically constructed and employed by social movements. Finally, the
chapter details the concept of frame resonance in order to show how and why

some collective action frames are so successful, while others fail, at convincing

current and potential human resources to mobilize for collective action.

Frames and Framing

Much ofthe academic discussion on frames began in 1974 with Erving
Goffman’s Frame Analysis. Collective action framing experts Robert D. Benford

and David A. Snow (2000, p. 611) cite Goffman’s book as the greatest influence

on the applied study ofthe concept of frames and the process of framing.

Goffman (1974, p. 8) writes that an individual is constantly attempting to answer

the question, “what is it that’s going on here?”. People ask themselves this
question in response to the experiences in which they are a part, as well the
experiences of others that are going on around them. Yet, while everyone asks
himself or herself this same perennial question, not everyone answers it the

same way. Just as some people might see a violent socio-political movement as
freedom fighters while others see terrorists, the answer to “what is it that’s going

on here?" is often a subjective gray area where the difference is a matter of
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perspective (Goffman, 1974). In the constant attempt to answer the ever-present

question, “what is it that’s going on here?”, individuals break up their experiences

into “strips” of reality that Goffman (1974, p. 10) describes as “any arbitrary slice
or cut from the stream of ongoing activity.” A set of social principles called

“frames,” in turn, interpret those strips (Goffman, 1974, p. 10-11).
The concept of defining experience is not exclusive to Goffman. In

Theories of Human Communication, Stephen W. Littlejohn (1999) reiterates the

concept of the human need to define and classify experiences. Littlejohn (1999)
writes:

Everybody tries to make sense of their own experience. We assign
meaning to what is going on, both inside us and around us. Sometimes
the meaning is shared, and sometimes it is not Sometimes it is clear and

other times vague or contradictory, (p. 3)
In communications theory, these assigned meanings allow people to

communicate their experiences to others in a more efficient manner (Littlejohn,
1999). Goffman (1974, p. 24) echoes that point, writing, ‘We tend to perceive

events in terms of primary frameworks, and the type of framework we employ

provides a way of describing the event to which it is applied.”
Goffman’s (1974, p. 21) primary frameworks form a “schemata of

interpretation” that are classified as either natural or social. “Natural

frameworks,” he writes, “identify occurrences seen as undirected” or “purely
physical," involving things such as the weather or other events that are subject to
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only “natural determinants” (Goffman, 1974, p. 22). By contrast, social

frameworks “provide background understanding for events that incorporate the

will, aim, and controlling effort on an intelligence, a live agency, the chief one

being the human being” (Goffman, 1974, p. 22). Social frameworks set up
“guided doings,” that are influenced and judged by the social norms and values

of those giving and receiving the controlling effort (Goffman, 1974, p. 22). These
social norms and values “constitute a central element” of a group’s culture
(Goffman, 1974, p. 27).
When guided doings come in the form of active agency, they do so

through a process called framing. Framing involves the construction and
manipulation of perception and the shared understandings in which people

understand and define reality (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 614; Grisham, 2009, p.
75). In the words of framing experts John A. Noakes and Hank Johnston (2005,

p. 2), “framing functions in much the same way as a frame around a picture:
attention gets focused on what is relevant and important and away from

extraneous items in the field of view.” Such attention is focused by amplifying the

“elements of existing beliefs and values” that are usually “associated with existing

ideologies" (Snow & Benford, 2005, p. 209).

Just as the basic concept of frames has academic crossover with a wide
variety of disciplines, so does the basic concept of framing. Due to its

prevalence in a wide variety of social theories, the study of framing is found in

such social science fields as sociology, psychology, and political sciences, as
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well as in the disciplines of communication and rhetorical studies (Benford &

Snow, 2000). Snow and Benford (2005, p. 210) cite the availability of source
material and the relative ease of “first-hand observation, examination, and
analysis” as the reason for the recent academic popularity of collective action
frames. For example, there are striking similarities between the framing
concepts articulated by Snow, Benford, Noakes, and Johnston and theories of

discourse articulated by Stephen W. Littlejohn. Littlejohn (1999, p. 83) states that
discourse, or “complex acts that form messages” is a way to use language in
order to achieve a particular goal, and has different structures depending on the

nature of that goal. He accents the sentiment of those above, claiming that, by

analyzing discourse, we can discover “the various ways in which
accomplishments are achieved through messages” (Littlejohn, 1999, p. 83).

Littlejohn (1999, p. 97) seems to find the means of discourse to be as important
as the ends, reiterating the point that all human communication conveys, not only

“our own version of the truth but also an intent to do something with the words we
use.” And it is in those intentions that we find the true meaning of the words

used (Littlejohn, 1999).

Collective Action Frames
Intentions are what differentiate basic frames and framing from collective

action frames and collective action framing. While basic framing merely attempts

to answer the question, “what is it that’s going on here?” collective action frames
also answer, “what should be going on here?” and “what should we do about
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what is going on here?” (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 614). Noakes and Johnston

(2005, p. 2) write that “individuals must be convinced that an injustice has
occurred, persuaded that collective action is called for, and motivated to act if a
social movement is to occur.” Collective action frames give a socio-political

movement a “structured voice” in which to communicate with potential and

existing human resources by acting as an ideological link between an individual
and a collective identity (Benford & Snow, 2000, pp. 631-2; Grisham, 2009, p.
56). These frames are “intended to mobilize potential adherents and

constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists” by
legitimating “the activities and campaigns of a social movement organization"
(Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 614). In other words, the purpose of collective action
frames is to attract, maintain, and mobilize the human resources of a social

movement.
The academic study of collective action frames largely began in 1980.

Since then, social scientists consider frames to be a critical element in
understanding the motivations and life cycles of social movements (Benford &

Snow, 2000). That same year, Todd Gitlin’s The Whole World is Watching: Mass
Media in the Making and Unmaking of the New Left introduced social movement
academics to the idea that Goffman’s concept of frames could be applied to their

research. In it, Gitlin (1980) focused on the ways the American mainstream

media depicted the Students for a Democratic Society, and proved that the New

York Times had applied a variety of negative frames to the movement. Two
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years later, William Gamson and others published Encounters with Unjust

Authority, turning the focus of frames from their use by the media against a social
movement to their use by a social movement (Gamson, Fireman, & Rytina,
1982). By offering collective action frames as a potential motivating factor in the

decision to join a collective action, Gamson’s (1992b) work provided a structural

alternative to the then conventional “organizational theory and decision-making
models that stressed participants’ cost-benefit calculations” (Noakes & Johnston,
2005, p. 3). As academic understandings of social movements continued to

evolve through the works of Gitlin, Gamson, and others, so did the study of the
collective action framing theories that were being used to help define and
understand those movements.

By 1990, noted sociologists such as David Snow and Robert Benford had
developed elaborate theories on the processes and mechanisms of collective

action framing, including those of frame alignment, frame resonance, and master
frames. Social movement entrepreneurs, defined by Noakes and Johnston

(2005, p. 7) as “people who exhibit strategic initiative in spreading the word about
their cause and promoting its message,” utilize such processes and mechanisms.
Since the 1990s, Gamson and Snow continue to be leaders in the study of

framing processes, while each focusing on a separate, yet equally important
perspective, as shown in Figure 2. Gamson gives attention to the social and

psychological mechanisms going on within an individual to motivate a person to
join a social movement, while Snow focuses on the ways social movement
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entrepreneurs use collective action frames to try to motivate such responses
(Benford & Snow, 2000; Noakes & Johnston, 2005).
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Figure 2. Primary Foci of Snow and Gamson

Components of a Collective Action Frame. Collective action frames
identify what a movement perceives as a problem, those responsible for creating
the problem, and a proposed solution to the problem. These primary frames

perform their “core tasks” through a combination of what Benford and Snow
(2000, p. 615) call diagnostic framing, prognostic framing, and motivational
framing (Noakes & Johnston, 2005, p. 5). Social movement entrepreneurs

perform this strategic framing. Alternatively, Gamson (1992a) identifies a
collective action frame as a combination of identity components, agency
components, and injustice components. The main difference between the frame

components of Benford and Snow and those of Gamson is that Gamson (1992b)
opines that collective action frames must have an injustice component in order to
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be a collective action frame (Noakes & Johnston, 2005, p. 6). Citing the absence

of injustice frames in many “religious, self-help, and identity movements,”
Benford and Snow (2000, p. 615) acknowledge the existence of Garrison's

injustice frames, but argue that his assertion of their required presence in a frame

is too “sweeping” and lacks “theoretical or empirical support.” As Noakes and
Johnston (2005, p. 6) point out, however, “the overlap between these two

approaches is substantial enough that we consider them two sides of the same
mobilization coin.” This overlap is shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Components of a Collective Action Frame
Benford & Snow

Gamson
Identity

Diagnostic

Injustice

Prognostic
Agency
Motivational

The purpose of diagnostic framing is to identify to potential human

resources “a new interpretation of issues or events” that “tells what is wrong and

why” (Noakes & Johnston, 2005, p. 5). Diagnostic frames accomplish their
function by strategically articulating a problem and “focusing blame or
responsibility” for it onto a particular subject or subjects (Benford & Snow, 2000,

p. 616). Benford and Snow (2000, p. 616) take care to remind that different
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social movements, orthose within an individual movement, might not always
agree whom or what is to blame for a particular injustice, and that internal
conflicts can arise as a result of such disagreements.

The diagnostic framing explained by Benford and Snow encompasses
much of the same qualities as Gamson’s identity and injustice components of

framing, but with some notable differences. While Benford and Snow’s
diagnostic framing makes an effort to convince people there is a problem,

Gamson’s identity component assumes that the people already recognize the
problem as a problem. Rather than convincing people of a problem, identity
components make a connection with a group or groups, delineating the terms of

“we" and “them," where “we" becomes the individuals within the group. Once the
identity component has defined “we” and “them," the injustice component

completes the diagnostic framing process by placing blame for the known
problems on “them” (Gamson 1992a).
After diagnostic framing and identity and injustice components have

convinced people there is a problem and identified who the problem affects and
who is to blame, prognostic framing offers “a proposed solution to the problem, or

at least a plan of attack, and the strategies for carrying out the plan” (Benford &

Snow, 2000, p. 616). Benford and Snow (2000, p. 617) point out that prognostic

framing can go on between multiple organizations, with each articulating their

own solutions to the same problem, and can even contradict each other’s
prescriptions or their own previous solutions.
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Once the problems and causes have been identified and prescriptions for

its cure have been articulated, motivational framing attempts to get people off the
couch and into the streets, so to speak. Motivational framing is the social

movement’s “call to arms,” which, depending on the nature of the movement can

be taken figuratively or literally (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 617). This component
of collective action framing “attempts to give people a reason to join collective
action” by creating “socially constructed vocabularies” with which they can

identify (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 617; Noakes & Johnston, 2005, p. 6). The

ideas of motivational framing and social vocabularies are reminiscent of
Goffman’s (1974) guided doings and primary frameworks mentioned above, and

are very similar to Gamson’s agency component, in which people are
encouraged to become agents of change.

Strategic Framing Mechanisms and Processes. Collective action frames

originate from a variety of sources. Sometimes they are born from the actual
street protests for which they were intended to mobilize (Noakes & Johnston,
2005, p. 7), such as the rallying cry, “long live Egypt” that was heard rising from

the streets of Cairo during the 2011 uprising against the Mubarak regime.2 Most
of the time, however, collective action frames originate as part of an “active
process” by social movement entrepreneurs to mobilize current and potential

human resources into collective action (Zald, 1996, p. 269). Social movement
2 See Dina Zayed, "Protesters welcome army, sing ‘Long live Egypt,’”
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/28/us-egypt-curfew-idUSTRE70R7NZ20110128
(accessed September 18, 2011)
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rhetoricians take a “strategic initiative in spreading the.word about their cause
and promoting its message” (Noakes & Johnston, 2005, p. 7). Strategic framing
takes place through a combination of processes; including frame bridging, frame

amplification, frame extension, and frame transformation. These frame
alignment processes, as shown in Figure 3, put the message of the social

movement in line with the interests of its target audience so that it might resonate
with people and motivate them to become a human resource for the group

(Benford & Snow, 2000).

Figure 3. How Frames Become Resonant

Frame bridging takes place by “linking two or more ideologically congruent
but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem”

(Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 624). Examples of frame bridging include the
alignment of secular or religious ideas with nationalist perspectives, known

respectively as “secular nationalism,” such as that found in the Palestine
Liberation Organization, or “Islamic nationalism,” such as that found in Islamic

Jihad. Benford and Snow (2000, p. 624) point out that frame bridging is perhaps
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the least-studied frame alignment strategy and is probably the one that is the

most used.
According to Benford and Snow (2000, p. 624), most social movements try
to amplify frames in one way or another. Collective action frames are amplified

using elements such as catchy slogans, shared histories, and cultural symbols,

which echo the movement’s message and allow people to receive it in a more

digestible manner. Benford and Snow (2000) point out that frame amplification is
especially important to the life of movements whose ideologies and actions go
against the values of the dominant culture, such as with white supremacist

movements amplifying frames with ideas of “pride" and “heritage” (p. 625).
Frame extension involves extending the boundaries of an existing frame to

include areas that potential human resources believe to be important. Many
social movements have used this frame alignment strategy; but it is not,
however, without its inherent risks. As Grisham (2009, p. 77) and Benford and

Snow (2000, p. 625) point out, the inclusion of outside values can sometimes
lead to schisms between the true believers and pragmatic members of a
movement. Benford and Snow (2000, p. 625) further note that the internal
conflicts that can arise from frame extension show that the framing strategies of a

movement are not always dictated by the leaders of that movement, “and that
employing a particular alignment strategy does not always yield the desired

results.”
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Benford and Snow (2000, p. 625) list frame transformation as the “final
strategic alignment process," and define it as “changing old understandings and
meanings and/or generating new ones.” The pair point out that frames are not

static, but rather, dynamic; constantly being produced, reproduced, refined, and
contested as the needs ofthe movement and the needs of its framing audience
change (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 628). Three primary factors motivate social

movement entrepreneurs to transform their frames: political opportunity, culture,
and the intended audience (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 628).
Sometimes, either by the nature of an existing political structure, or by the

past gains of the socio-political movement, opportunities arise for the movement

to gain entry into “the institutionalized political system” (Grisham, 2009, p. 79;

Tarrow, 2011, pp. 32-33). When a movement takes advantage of such
opportunities, gaining entry into the formal political structure, it must alter its

collective action frames to reflect its new position within that political structure in
which it used to be critical and from which it used to be marginalized (Benford &

Snow, 2000; Grisham, 2009; Tarrow 2011).
In the words of anthropologists Javier Xavier India and Renato Rosaldo
(2008, p. 12), culture “refers to a group of people - whether a nation, ethnicity,
tribe, or so forth - who more or less use a system of shared meanings to

interpret and make sense ofthe world." They argue that modern globalization

has formed “circuits of economic, political, cultural and ecological
interdependence” that transcend both time and space (India & Rosaldo, 2008,
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pp. 7-8). Such connectivity, when combined with naturally occurring cultural
changes brought on by proximity to other cultures and other natural evolutionary

processes, has created “a world of culture in motion” and in flux (India &
Rosaldo, 2008, pp. 12-14). As with changes in political opportunities, changes in

cultural ideologies and identities require social movement entrepreneurs to alter
their frames to fall in line with those continual changes (Benford & Snow, 2000).

Regardless of the existence of political opportunities or constant cultural
shifts, frame alteration must occur to suit the rhetorical sensitivities of the
audience for which they are intended. Roderick Hart first articulated the idea of

rhetorical sensitivity in 1972. Then, Hart and others (1972) opined that
individuals are able to communicate more effectively when they alter their
message to suit particular audiences. Later, in 1980, Hart further expanded on

his ideas of rhetorical sensitivity, defining it as “a particular attitude toward
encoding spoken messages," which “represents a way of thinking about what
should be said and, then, a way of deciding how to say it" (Hart, Carlson & Eadie,

1980, p. 2). Social movements must also account for the rhetorical sensitivities

of their intended audience. In order to maximize their potential to attract human
resources, social movements must “appeal to multiple audiences who vary in

terms of their relative interests, values, beliefs, and knowledge”
(Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 630). As the audiences change, so must the frames

used to communicate with them.
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Frame Resonance Mechanisms and Processes. The decision whether or
not to take part in a social movement or collective action is not made in a
vacuum. Many factors, both conscious and subconscious, go into such a choice.
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=igure 4. How Frame Resonance Affects Human
Resources

One such factor is the resonance of a collective action frame. When social

movement entrepreneurs successfully employ the strategic frame alignment

processes articulated above, their collective action frames resonate with the
target audience and mobilize people to become or remain a human resource of

the movement (Gamson, 1992a; Benford & Snow, 2000; Noakes & Johnston,
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2005; Grisham, 2009; Tarrow, 2011). Alternatively, frames that fail to resonate
with the target audience do not mobilize potential or existing human resources,

and could even encourage people to remove themselves from the movement’s
pool of human resources, altogether (Benford & Snow, 2000; Noakes &
Johnston, 2005). This dynamic is shown in Figure 4, above.

While the basic concept of frame resonance is difficult to quantify or

measure (Noakes & Johnston, 2005, p. 16), its place in the practice and study of

framing processes is greatly substantiated. Noakes and Johnston (2005, p. 11)
define frame resonance as “the relationship between a collective action frame,
the aggrieved community that is the target of mobilizing efforts, and the broader

culture.” Benford and Snow (2000, p. 619) equally recognize the importance of
frame resonance, citing it as the measure of the “mobilizing potency" of a frame,

and the reason why some frames are “effective” and others are not. And

Gamson (1992a, p. 115) recognizes the concept and processes of frame
resonance as “resources” by which people construct and negotiate meaning.

While all of these noted academics agree on the importance of frame

resonance, they do not, however, agree on all of the factors that affect it or on
the organization of those factors. Benford and Snow (2000, p. 619) identify two
distinct, “interacting factors” that affect the level of resonance in a frame:

“credibility of the proffered frame and its relative salience.” Credibility is
influenced by factors the pair identifies as frame consistency, empirical credibility,

and the credibility of the frame makers, while salience is influenced by what they
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call centrality, experiential commensurability, and narrative fidelity (Benford &

Snow, 2000). Citing substantial crossover and an interest in making the concept

of frame resonance easier to understand for newer students of framing
processes, Noakes and Johnston (2005, p. 12) “suggest a more straightforward
way of organizing the terms” used to describe the intricacies of resonant frames.
Rather than focusing on the “consciousness of the audience" and the strategies
used by social movement entrepreneurs, the pair focus on what they consider

the sources of frame resonance: frame makers, frame receivers, and frame
qualities (Noakes & Johnston, 2005, pp. 11-12). They do, however, note the

need to have an understanding of “the entire gamut of terms” used to describe
the factors of frame resonance in order to fully appreciate its “finer distinctions"

(Noakes & Johnston, 2005, p. 24). Gamson (1992a), meanwhile, directs his

focus, as usual, toward the perceptions of the target audience, and the factors
that guide those perceptions.

When considering literature on the topic, this research identifies three
primary factors that affect frame resonance: credibility, relativity, and diffusion.

Credibility speaks to the credibility of the frame, as well as the credibility of the
movement producing it Collective action frames must also be relative to the real
world, as well as to the real people living within it. And, framed ideas must be
marketed in a deliberate, strategic fashion that resonates with potential and
existing human resources and will ultimately result in the diffusion of its message.
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Credibility. The effects of credibility on the resonance of a frame come

down to two factors: the credibility of the frame and the credibility of the
movement doing the framing. Frames must be relatively consistent with the
movement’s previously stated goals, ideologies, and actions (Benford & Snow,
2000, p. 620; Noakes & Johnston, 2005, p. 15). Alternatively, “inconsistency

between elements can undermine a frame,” decreasing its resonance (Noakes &

Johnston, 2005, p. 15). The inconsistency of a frame makes itself obvious to its
audience when the framed message goes against what the movement has said

in the past, as well as what it has done in the past Further inconsistencies show
themselves when a movement performs actions it has previously deemed
unacceptable, or when it fails to perform actions it previously stated it would

perform (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 620). In simple and common terms, frame
consistency for a social movement is about “practicing what you preach.”
Benford and Snow (2000, p. 620) cite that there has been little research on this

factor of frame resonance.
Popular wisdom also affects the credibility and resonance of a frame. As
explained by Gamson (1992a, p. 123), “people bring to bear many popular
beliefs that transcend the specific issue in question,” employing phrases such as

“As everyone knows,” and “You know what they say.” Tapping into popular
wisdom gives social movement entrepreneurs a greater potential audience, and,

in turn, a greater pool of potential human resources. However, “as everyone
knows,” what “everyone knows" is not always accurate or true. Popular wisdom
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and common knowledge is not always a gauge for reality. Benford and Snow

(2000, p. 620) point out that a collective action frame does not have to reflect the
absolute truth, or even be “generally believable, but that it must be believable to

some segment of prospective or actual adherents.” That being said, it must also

be recognized that, with a greater audience comes greater scrutiny ofthe frame,
rendering absolutely false claims a difficult sell for even the most skilled social
movement entrepreneurs.
The resonant factor of credibility does not end with the collective action
frame; the movement creating and propagating the frame, as well as its leaders,

must also be credible. The more credible the social movement and its

entrepreneurs, the more “persuasive” the message (Benford & Snow, 2000, p.

621). Such credibility comes from status, claimed, as well as “perceived
expertise,” and the overall credibility ofthe movement (Benford & Snow, 2000, p.

621). By making “claims of expertise” about themselves and their
representatives, social movement entrepreneurs “amplify their frame and

increase its resonance" (Noakes & Johnston, 2005, p. 13). Such claims often

draw scrutiny by critically thinking audience members, who may also be “experts"
in their own right, and who may view the frame makers “as acting outside their
area of expertise” (Noakes & Johnston, 2005, p. 13). Such potential

perspectives may inhibit members ofthe target audience from mobilizing, and
may also “inhibit some actors from promoting their frames as aggressively as

they would like” (Noakes & Johnston, 2005, p. 13).
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The credibility and charisma of a movement’s leaders also plays a
significant part in the resonance of a collective action frame. In Charisma,

Bureaucracy, and Revolution, sociologist Max Weber (1947, p. 358) defined
charisma as “a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is
set apart from ordinary men and treated with... exceptional powers or qualities.”

Weber (1947, p. 361) goes on to describe charismatic authority as being “sharply

opposed to... traditional authority.” Noakes and Johnston (2005, pp. 13-14) posit
that, either by their very nature, or through strategic effort, the qualities of a

charismatic leader “can amplify frames and attract followers.”

Relativity. In order to resonate with the target audience, collective action
frames must relate to the real, everyday lives of that audience, as well as to its

real, everyday people. As stated by Sidney Tarrow (1992, p. 189), “movement
organizers must operate within the cognitive and evaluative universe that they

find rather than create a new one.” Frames that address the everyday lives of

people show that the movement understands the daily trials of the frame
audience. On the other hand, frames that are not relevant to the daily lives of the

frame audience can give the impression that the movement does not “get it,”

decreasing the credibility of the frame and its promoters. Benford and Snow
(2000, pp. 620, 621-622) describe the alignment of collective action frames to

real world events and issues as “empirical credibility” and “experiential

commensurability.” Noakes and Johnston (2005, pp. 13, 15-16) wholeheartedly
agree, while opting to refer to the factor as “frame relevance." Gamson (1992a,
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pp. 122-123, 163), on the other hand, focuses on the ways individuals react to

relative frames based on their “experiential knowledge” and the “proximity” of the

claims to an individual’s “personal life.” Yet, despite their differences, they all
recognize the resonant effects of frames that tap into the real life issues of

people.
It is not enough for collective action frames to relate to the daily lives of
individuals; they must also relate to the individuals themselves. Collective action

frames relate to individuals on two levels: ideologically and culturally. The term
“ideology” refers to the ideas and beliefs of an individual or group. Benford and

Snow’s (2000, p. 621) “centrality” addresses “the beliefs, values, and ideas
associated with the movement’s frames” being important to “the targets of
mobilization.” The two theorize that the more the movement’s frames are able to

tap into the audience’s core beliefs, “the greater the probability of their

mobilization” (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 621). Likewise, Noakes and Johnston
(2005, p. 14) cite that an individual’s “beliefs and values affect how targeted
groups perceive a frame’s claims and symbols, and consequently, whether they

are likely to be mobilized by it.” As with other factors of frame resonance,
Benford and Snow (2000, p. 621) admit to there being little research on the factor

of salient centrality in collective action frames, limiting their support to “a few
studies” that “appear to confirm it.”

Collective action frames must also relate culturally to their target audience.
Benford and Snow (2000, p. 622) cite cultural resonances as the most important
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factor of frame resonance, supporting their claim by pointing to “a plethora of

studies across a wide array of social movements," which includes a Central

American refugee sanctuary movement and a democratic movement in China.

Whether it is the “narrative fidelity" articulated by Benford and Snow (2000, p.

622), the “cultural resonance" of Gamson (1992a, pp. 135-162), or Noakes and
Johnston’s (2005, pp. 14-15) “demographic orientations" and “cultural
compatibility,” scholars in the field are in general agreement; frames are more

resonant when they “synchronize with society’s cultural stock - and especially

the ‘cultural tool kit’ of the target audience” (Noakes & Johnston, 2005, pp. 15).
Gamson (1992a, p. 135) supports that point, stating that collective action frames
that appeal to cultural resonances have a “natural advantage” over those that do

not.
Diffusion. The methods in which social movement entrepreneurs

introduce their frames to a target audience are as important as the message
being framed. Collective action frames require deliberate, strategic marketing in
order to be effectively resonant. However, not all marketing strategies are

created equal. Repertoires, or the methods in which movements contend for

power, including framing, must be effective, while simultaneously meeting the
expectations of others (Tarrow, 2011, pp. 39-40). Furthermore, not all

repertoires will resonate the same way with people. Messages marketed through
violent means, for example, may resonate with some, while repulsing others. An

example of the latter was clearly displayed in the negative reaction of Jordanians
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to the 2005 bombing of three hotels in the capital, Amman, by the violent Islamist
movement, al Qaeda. While al Qaeda claimed the hotels were targeted due to

their prominence with American and Israeli tourists, Jordanians saw the act as a

terrorist affront to their nationalism, alternatively framing the event as “Jordan’s

9/11.”3 Framed ideas also spread through natural processes of diffusion. When
an idea or claim resonates with an individual or group, people will naturally talk

about it with others. While unclear as to the extent, the power of modern
communications technologies arid social media networking, as displayed in the
recent series of Middle East uprisings known as the “Arab Spring”,4 acts as a

multiplier to the power of word-of-mouth to spread ideas. Gamson (1992a, p.
118) points to the diffusion into contemporary culture of the United Negro College

Fund slogan “A mind is a terrible thing to waste” as proof of the connection

between media discourse and frame resonance.

Conclusion

Noted academics in the field of social sciences generally agree; frames
allow individuals to give context and meaning to the world around them, and
make communication between people more efficient and effective. As a result of
those shared understandings, collective action frames facilitate communication

3 See “’Al-Qaeda’ claims Jordan attacks”, http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/4423714.stm
(accessed Octobers, 2011).

4 See Sheldon Himelfarb, "Social media in the Middle East,”
http://www.usip.org/publications/social-media-in-the-middle-east (accessed October 9, 2011).
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from social movements to their current and potential human resources. Through

processes of strategic construction and marketing, social movement

entrepreneurs construct frames that resonate with individuals and groups,

encouraging their mobilization as members, supporters or sympathizers for a
social movement organization. However, as noted above, not all social scientists
agree on the processes and mechanisms by which frames are constructed, nor
do they agree on how and why they resonate. Further research is necessary to

forward our understanding of this powerful form of human resource mobilization.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CASE STUDY

Hamas

Hamas (Harakat al-Muqawamat al-lslamiyyah or “Islamic Resistance

Movement”) is a highly complex organization that spans decades. The

organization is motivated by Islamist and nationalist ideologies, and its staunch
opposition to the state of Israel. This dichotomous, multi-faceted socio-political

movement - both loathed and loved - has been aptly described as terrorists by
its enemies and freedom fighters by its supporters. Yet, regardless of its many

monikers and faces, as well as the many challenges against it, Hamas has

managed to grow as a movement and maintain its socio-political viability and

influence in the region.
The complex nature of Hamas requires one studying the movement to

have a general understanding of its ideologies5 and its history6. By

5 It should be noted that, while Hamas does subscribe to particular ideologies, not everyone who
subscribes to those same ideologies individually or collectively is a member, supporter, or
sympathizer of Hamas. It should be further noted that the coverage of the ideologies mentioned
in this research is limited to that which pertains directly to this research.

6 The history mentioned in this research is limited only to that which pertains to this research. For
works that go into greater detail, see P. Caridi, (2009), Hamas: from resistance to government, Z.
Chehab, (2007), Inside Hamas: the untold story of the Islamic Resistance Movement, K. Hroub,
(2000), Hamas: political thought and practice; K. Hroub, (2006), Hamas: a beginner’s guide; B
Milton-Edwards & S. Farreii, (2010), Hamas: the Islamic Resistance Movement; S. Mishal & R.
Aharoni, (1994), Speaking stones: communiques from the intifada underground; S. Mishal & A.
Sela, (2000), The Palestinian Hamas: vision, violence, and coexistence; J. Schanzer, (2008),
Hamas vs. Fatah: the struggle for Palestine; and A. Tamimi, (2007), Hamas: a history from within.
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understanding these facets ofthe movement, we gain a greater understanding of

its use of frames and framing processes. As previously explained in detail,

ideologies shape the frameworks by which individuals perceive and communicate
about the world around them. And the organization’s history before and after its
inception have greatly influenced the direction and tone of its collective action

frames.
Ideologies
As detailed in the above section on frames and framing processes, the
ideologies of individuals and of groups form basic frameworks by which they

perceive the world and ideas around them, as well as the ways by which they
communicate and respond to the world and ideas around them. The primary
ideologies that shape the frameworks of Hamas are Palestinian nationalism and

Islamism. A general understanding of these two ideologies, as they apply to
Hamas, is vital to understanding the ideological frameworks ofthe group and its

pool of human resources.
Palestinian Nationalism. At its core, Palestinian nationalism is the concept

of a recognized and independent Palestinian state. While there have been, and
continue to be varying definitions and demands regarding what exactly such a

state should entail, that it must exist is a longstanding and widely held opinion
within the greater Palestinian community, as well as with many in the

international community. Palestinian nationalism is marked largely by a series of
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events and conflicts with varying imperialist or occupying powers, and is an
ideology that has been building over decades.

The general idea of Palestinian nationalism began taking shape as we

know it today after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. When the borders of the post-

WWI Middle East were being negotiated by policy-makers and emerging world
leaders, Palestinians were largely left out of the discussions. Such was the case

of the Faisal-Weizmann Agreement of 1919. In that agreement, a delegation
representing Zionist7 interests came to terms regarding a Jewish state and Arab

kingdom with Faisal bin Hussein bin Ali al-Hashemi, seen by many as the sole
representative of Arab, and by default, Palestinian interests. Unfortunately,

however, “no Palestinian Arab view was consulted," leading many to believe that
Faisal “had abandoned Palestine,” and giving Palestinians their first notice that
they would have to walk the path to statehood without much help from fellow
Arabs (Smith, 2010, p. 77-8, 98-100).

One non-Palestinian Arab who was willing to aid in the Palestinian cause
was Syrian-born Izz al-Din al-Qassam. Al-Qassam, a staunch anti-imperialist
and anti-Zionist who saw moral, political, and violent jihad as the “remedy" for the

problems of the Palestinian people, led his 1935 group, The Black Hand, against
Zionist and British forces in the British Mandate of Palestine (Schleifer, 1993, p.

173). Surrounded and facing the prospect of capture, “al-Qassam told his men to
7 Zionism is the idea of a sovereign Jewish state of Israel in the region of Palestine. As with the
ideology of Palestinian nationalism, there are varying definitions as to what that state should
entail.
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die as martyrs, and he opened fire” (Schleifer, 1993, p. 166). In the months and
years that followed, “peasant guerrilla bands and urban commandos led by other

Qassamiyum (as his followers were called) sprang up across Palestine,”
continuing al-Qassam’s Great Arab Revolt until 1939 (Schleifer, 1993, p. 166).
The memory of al-Qassam continues to inspire martyrdom and nationalist revolt

against Israel, and is the name of the military wing of Hamas, as well as the
homemade rockets that are routinely fired from the Gaza Strip into Israel.

The 1947 United Nations partitioning of Palestine and the subsequent

declaration of the state of Israel the following year marks another defining era in
the formation of Palestinian identity. Following the recommendations of a special
committee on Palestine, the United Nations voted to end the British Mandate of

Palestine and partition the region into Jewish- and Arab-controlled territories.
The following year, on May 14, David Ben-Gurion declared the formation of the

Jewish state of Israel. On May 15, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were
instantly transformed into refugees and internally displaced people’s, pouring into
camps in the Palestinian territories in what continues to be known as Yawm anNakbah, or “day of the catastrophy” (Smith, 2010; Khalidi, 1997). By the end of

the resulting 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the perceived need for a Palestinian state
was intensified by the Egyptian and Jordanian takeovers of the Gaza Strip and

West Bank, respectively. Such sentiment was mirrored when Israel decisively

captured and subsequently occupied both territories in its 1967 war with Egypt,
Jordan, and Syria.
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The First and Second Intifadas (Uprisings) have also influenced

Palestinian nationalism. These uprisings against Israeli occupation of the
Palestinian Territories unified Palestinians in a common goal against a common
enemy. While there were certainly divisions and competition regarding the
groups vying for leadership of the uprisings, the revolts had a rallying effect on

the Palestinian people, and served as yet another example of the need for
recognized national sovereignty (Khalidi, 1997).
Islamism. The term “Islamism” means many different things to many

different people. Growing prevalent in the 1980s, the word quickly came “to

signify the belief among radical Muslims that political and social action should be
based on Islam,” and has, with the rise of Islamic-based terrorism, maintained
much of that subjective connotation ever since (Sfeir, 2007, p. 170). As

explained, however, in The Columbia world dictionary of Islamism:
Islamism is a political and religious ideology that aims to establish an

Islamic state under the Shari’a8 law and to reunify the Muslim Umma (i.e.
the Islamic community). Behind this relatively simple definition lies a
complex picture where the situation varies in different countries, or as
interpreted by different ideological movements.... (Sfeir, 2007, p. 170).

Therefore, while those who espouse an Islamist ideology may be radical

8 The term Shari’a basically translates to “Islamic law,” which is based on the Qur’an and the
words and deeds (Sunna) of the Muslim prophet Muhammad, as well as various interpretive
factors.
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Muslims, not all Islamists are necessarily radicals9. Hamas’s version of Islamism
was adopted largely from the teachings of two influential Egyptian Islamists and

Ikhwan members - Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb (Chehab, 2007; Hroub,

2006; Milton-Edwards & Farrell, 2010; Mishal & Sela, 2000; Schanzer, 2008).
Hassan al-Banna is widely recognized as the founder of the Muslim

Brotherhood (Lapidus, 2002). Dissatisfied with the secular and what he

considered decadent state of Egyptian social conditions at the time, Al-Banna
professed the need of “the restoration of Islamic principles, and a return to the

Quran [SIC] and Islamic piety’’ (Lapidus, 2002, p. 522). In 1928 he founded the
Society of Muslim Brothers (The Muslim Brotherhood), quickly building “an

extensive following divided into cells or chapters, which organized mosques,
schools [and], clinics... (Lapidus, 2002, p. 522). Later, throughout the years
between 1942 and 1945, al-Banna travelled to Palestine, “establishing several
branches of the Brotherhood in some of its major cities” (Chehab, 2007, p. 18).

Hassan al-Banna was assassinated in Egypt in 1948 following the assassination
of Egyptian Prime Minister Mahmoud Fahmi Nokrashi by a member of the
Ikhwan (Chehab, 2007). In the months immediately following al-Banna’s death,

the Ikhwan adopted a greater political tone, “calling] for the establishment of an

9 Terms such as “moderate” and "radical" are highly subjective and are often a matter of
perspective and relativity. For example, Hamas may be considered radical compared to the
modern-day Muslim Brotherhood, but may be considered moderate when compared to groups
like Afghanistan’s Taliban.
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Islamic government based on consultation with the 'ulama and devoted to the

application of the Shari’a..." (Lapidus, 2002, p. 522).

That tone seemed to resonate with one of Egypt’s noted intellectuals.
Sayyid Qutb was a teacher, prolific author, and critic of Western imperialism.

Appointed to Egypt’s Ministry of Education in 1940, Qutb became, like al-Banna
before him, dissatisfied with the corrupt state of Egyptian socio-political

conditions he saw. For reasons still unknown, Qutb’s relatively secular,
nationalist writings became much more religious in tone (Calvert, 2010). As John
Calvert (2010) explains in Sayyid Qutb and the origins of radical Islamism:

Writing in 1948, [Qutb] began to base his call for a just political, economic,
and social order on the teachings of the Qur’an and the example of the
Prophet.... In the manner of the Muslim Brothers, Qutb came to define

Islam as an “action-oriented force not only in the traditional areas of
morals but also in the areas of collective ethics, domestic politics, and

international relations” (p. 127).
By 1953, Qutb had become a member of the Ikhwan, quickly rising through its

ranks. Following a failed 1954 assassination attempt on Egyptian President
Abdel Nasser, a ban was placed on the Muslim Bortherhood, and many of its
members, including Qutb, were imprisoned. While serving his ten-year sentence,

Qutb wrote what would become an Islamist “manifesto" entitled Milestones. In it,

Qutb cited that Muslims in the West, as well as many in the Middle East, had
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adopted jahiliya10 (ignorance of Islam), asserting that “the primary task of good
Muslims must be retreat (hijra), as the Prophet had retreated to Medina;

excommunication (takfir) of the false Muslims; [and] the waging of jihad.

(Lapidus, 2002, p. 531). In the words of historian Ira Lapidus (2002), “This was
an uncompromising revolutionary point of view” (p. 531). In 1966, Qutb was

again arrested for sedition and was executed (Calvert, 2010).

History
A general understanding ofthe history before and during the existence of

Hamas is important to gaining a greater understanding of its framing processes
and mechanisms. The years and days that lead up to the creation and
introduction of Hamas influence the framework of its potential human resources,
and, therefore, the framework of Hamas. Similarly, the conflicts that perpetuate

the existence and viability of Hamas shape the frameworks of human resources
and of Hamas, as well as the resonance factors that make its framing efforts so

successful.
The Muslim Brotherhood. While there are certainly a variety of factors that

went into the eventual creation of Hamas, arguably the most influential factor is
the organization’s ideological and physical connection to Egypt’s Muslim

Brotherhood, or Ikhwan. Filling the void created by the fall of the Ottoman
Empire, Islamist groups began springing up in the British Mandate of Palestine

10 Jahiliya refers to the period before Islam, which many Muslims consider to be a time of relative
ignorance and barbarism.
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throughout the 1920s, ‘30s, and ‘40s. In 1945, the Brotherhood opened a branch

in the city of Jerusalem. By the time of the 1947 termination of the British
Mandate and subsequent partitioning of Palestine into separate Jewish and

Palestinian territories by the United Nations, the Ikhwan had opened more than

thirty-five branches throughout the region that attracted approximately ten

thousand members (Mishal & Sela, 2000).
Following the 1948 war for Israeli independence, Jordan annexed the

Palestinian territory of the West Bank, while Egypt maintained military
administration over the Palestinian territory of the Gaza Strip. During that time,
Jordan and Egypt each enacted policies that attempted to address the Islamist
sentiment growing within their respective areas of control. In the West Bank, the
Hashemite Kingdom maintained a relatively tolerant relationship with Islamists,

including the Muslim Brotherhood, who it did not see as a threat. Such was not
the case in the Gaza Strip, however. Following a failed coup attempt, after which

the gunman claimed Ikhwan affiliation, Egypt’s president, Gamal Nasser, closed
all Brotherhood branches, arrested its leaders, and banned the movement

throughout Egypt and the Gaza Strip (Milton-Edwards & Farrell, 2010).
The 1967 war between Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria marked a turning

point for the Palestinian Territories, and for the people who resided within them.
The war left the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the hands of Israeli occupiers,

while also proving to the Palestinian people that they could not rely on their fellow
Arabs to protect them, or to help them achieve a recognized Palestinian state.
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With the idea of Arab nationalism teetering on the brink of oblivion, Palestinian

nationalism was pushed to the forefront by the largely secular Palestine

Liberation Organization (PLO). Made up of various nationalist movements, the
PLO was formed in 1964, with the blessings of multiple “Arab kings and heads of

state,” to be the “entity” to represent the Palestinian cause (Nassar, 1991, p. 19).
“Across the region, the socially conservative and anti-nationalist Muslim
Brotherhood was, yet again, perceived as badly out of step with the revolutionary

ethos of the time” (Milton-Edwards & Farrell, 2010, p. 38).
Ahmed Yassin. That was not the case, however, within the Gaza Strip.

Ahmed Yassin, a quadriplegic schoolteacher who later became the spiritual,
charismatic leader of Hamas, had been a key member of the Ikhwan’s efforts
there since 1968 (Mishal & Sela, 2000). Yassin believed it was his duty as a
Muslim “to bring Islam to the secularized youth” of the Gaza Strip, “devoting

himself to promoting Islamic revivalism through preaching and education” (Milton-

Edwards & Farrell, 2010, p. 39). To facilitate that revival, Yassin founded Gaza’s
Islamic Center in 1973.

The purpose of the Islamic Center, however, proved to be more than just
that of Islamic revival. In a 1999 interview with journalist Zaki Chehab, Yassin

admitted that those within the Center had begun thinking about armed resistance
against Israel. Yassin claimed:

By the 1980s we had grown in strength, and began amassing weapons.
Many of us were imprisoned for this but, on our release in 1985, we had

63

developed a strategy (Chehab, 2007, p. 21).
The multi-phased strategy developed by Yassin and his associates involved first

setting up social institutions, followed by the strengthening of the “political
credibility” of the Center, the development of “military capabilities, and, finally, the

eventual engagement of Arab and Islamic leaders in direct dialog (Chehab, 2007,
p. 22). Near the end of 1987, Yassin and others had completed the first two
phases of their plan. In an October meeting, they agreed that the time was right

to form a new movement that combined the existing socio-political institutions of
the Islamic Center with a military wing to fight against Israeli occupation and a
security wing to monitor Palestinian activity. Two months later, events in Gaza’s

Jabalya Refugee Camp would spark the First Intifada and introduce Hamas to
I

the world (Chehab, 2007).
The First Intifada. The First Palestinian Intifada began in early December,

1987. On the 8th of that month, an Israeli tank transport crashed into automobiles

in the Jabalya Refugee Camp in the northern portion of the Gaza Strip, killing

and wounding several Palestinians. Reaction by Palestinians was both swift and
spontaneous. Almost immediately, secular, Muslim, and Christian Palestinians,

alike, took to the streets in leaderless protest of the incident. Within days,
multiple organizations, including the PLO and Hamas, were vying to fill that

leaderless vacuum (Smith, 2010).
One of the primary methods of communication between the Intifada’s
rebellious organizations and the rebellious public with whom they were trying to
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engage were leaflets. The leaflets that “enjoyed the widest circulation” were
those of Hamas and the PLO-backed United National Leadership of the Uprising
(UNLU) (Mishal & Aharoni, 1994, p. 28; Milton-Edwards & Farrell, 2010). Both

groups published and generously distributed pamphlets that called for strikes and
boycotts against Israeli businesses, civil disobedience against Israeli authority,
and violent conflict against the Israeli occupation. Leaflets by both parties also
addressed a wide range of social issues, such as “work, health, transportation,
education, agriculture, [and] commerce” (Mishal & Aharoni, 1994, p. 29). Hamas
literature, which was published in and favored by the Gaza Strip, took on a
religious tone, while the UNLU’s leaflets were largely based on secular

nationalism. And, of course, each group put out literature that tried to damage
the credibility and influence of the other (Mishal & Aharoni, 1994).

Madrid and Oslo Peace Talks. The First Intifada raged on for more than

five years, leading to many casualties on both sides. By 1991, Israel, Jordan,
Syria, Lebanon, and Palestinian representatives from the PLO met in Madrid,

Spain to negotiate a peace deal sponsored by the United States and the Soviet
Union. The initial meeting went for three days, with eleven subsequent meeting

to follow over the course of two years. Hamas was excluded from the talks. As
such, the organization denounced, and made routine efforts to derail the Madrid
talks. That same year, the organization formed a new military wing, the Izz Ed

Din Al-Qassam Brigades, named after the revered leader of rebellion against

post-Ottoman British occupiers after World War I (Milton-Edwards & Farrell,
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2010). In the summer of 1993, a cease-fire agreement was finally reached by

those in attendance, which still did not include Hamas.
The Madrid cease-fire agreement of 1993 led to further negotiations in

Oslo, Norway that same year. As with the Madrid talks, Hamas was excluded
from the process. And, as with the Madrid talks, the organization summarily

rejected and made every attempt to discredit the Oslo talks, as well as the PLO
that was selected to be a part of it. Eventually, through the Oslo negotiations and

its subsequent meetings, the PLO would agree to “recognize Israel, renounce
violence, amend its charter, and recognize Israeli sovereignty over the parts of

historic Palestine which Israel had gained in the 1948 war” (Milton-Edwards &

Farrell, 2010, p. 68). In return, Israel agreed to redeploy its forces in the
Palestinian territories it occupied, and that the PLO would be the sovereign, yet
stateless voice of the Palestinian people; a move .that gave eventual birth to the
Palestinian National Authority and Yasser Arafat as its president (Smith, 2010).
The Second Intifada. Tit-for-tat violence between Hamas, Fatah, and
Israel continued during and after the Oslo Agreements, with all three entities

fighting each other. Such violence was exasperated by Hamas’s new tactic of
suicide bombings in response to an attack on a Muslim place of worship by an
Israeli settler. Back-and-forth negotiations between the PLO’s Fatah11-controlled
PNA and Israel also continued. However, that would change on September 28,

11 Fatah is the largest and most influential organization within the greater Palestinian Liberation
Organization.
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2000. That day, Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon took a stroll through the
Old City portion of Jerusalem, making sure to stop at one of Islam’s holiest sites

- the Noble Sanctuary (Haram al-Sharif), which features the Al Aqsa Mosque

and the Dome of the Rock. Palestinians, “seeing it as an attempt to assert Israeli
control over the long-disputed site12,” reacted predictably (Milton-Edwards &

Farrell, 2010, p. 87). By the following day, Palestinians were again called on to
wage civil unrest and violence against Israel (Schanzer, 2008). The Second

Intifada had begun.

Authors of books on the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict, as well as Israeli
officials disagree as to the spontaneity of the Second Intifada. While some

subscribe to the opinion that it was a spontaneous action sparked by Sharon’s

walkabout, others assert that it was a planned event that was simply waiting for
an excuse to happen (Milton-Edwards & Farrell, 2010, pp. 87-8; Schanzer, 2008,

p. 49). Regardless, what quickly became clear and indisputable was that Arafat
and the PLO/Fatah was going to use it to try and bolster their standings within
the greater Palestinian community. Calls went out from PLO-controlled media to

the Palestinian people to revolt against Israel in what “some called... Arafat’s
War” (Schanzer, 2008, p. 49). Hamas, meanwhile, garnered significant attention

during the Second Intifada by continuing its leaflet campaign, as well as waging
violent acts against Israeli soldiers, militia, and civilians. Being the president of
12 The site has been home to and in very close proximity to Jewish, Christian, and Muslim
temples for centuries, and has been fought over as early as the Crusades and as recent as the
1967 Arab-Israeli War.
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the PLO, which was now recognized as the sole voice ofthe Palestinian people,
Arafat was challenged by Israeli and Western officials to address the problem of

Hamas, of violent PLO-based groups, and of the Intifada, in general (Milton-

Edwards & Farrell, 2010). By the close ofthe Second Intifada in 2005, Yasser

Arafat and Ahmed Yassin would both be dead13, and the PLO’s attempt to play
on both sides of the political and actual battlefield resulted in decreasing its
popularity and influence with Palestinians, while simultaneously increasing

popular support for Hamas (Milton-Edwards & Farrell, 2010).
The Palestinian Legislative Elections. The sense of growing public

support for Hamas was not lost on the organization, itself. Having boycotted the
PNA elections of 1996, Hamas made the decision to enter the political arena in

the 2005 Palestinian local elections. While missing the first round of voting in

late 2004, the Hamas-based List of Change and Reform party quickly put its

extensive socio-political network into action to gain control of “forty-eight local
councils, compared with Fatah’s fifty-six” (Milton-Edwards & Farrell, 2010, p.

244). It was quickly becoming evident that Hamas would be a political force to
be reckoned with; a point that would be made crystal clear in the PNA legislative

elections the following year. In those 2006 elections, “Hamas won seventy-four

seats in the 132-seat parliament and Fatah won just forty-five” (Milton-Edwards &
Farrell, 2010, p. 259). Furthermore, Hamas took forty-five seats in various

13 Yasser Arafat died of unknown and still disputed causes on November 11, 2004 and Ahmed
Yassin was killed by a Hellfire missile fired from an Israeli gunship on March 22, 2004.
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districts, while Fatah claimed just seventeen (Milton-Edwards & Farrell, 2010, p.

259).

Hamas’s electoral victory should have given it control of the PNA. Outside
pressures from the West, however, influenced Fatah to deny Hamas its
democratic victory, including the right to name the Palestinian prime minister.

Such actions served only to widen the rift between Hamas, Fatah, and the PLO,

coming to a head in the 2007 Palestinian Civil War that ended with Hamas firmly
entrenched and in administrative control of the Gaza Strip. Since then, Hamas

and the PNA have made a number of attempts at reconciliation. And, of course,
Hamas has continued its often violent struggle against Israel (Milton-Edwards &

Farrell, 2010).
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CHAPTER SIX
DOCUMENT ANALYSES

This chapter will provide an analysis of a variety of primary sources by
Hamas in order to discover the collective action framing mechanisms and

processes and recurring themes contained therein. First, the official charter of
Hamas will be examined, followed by an examination of various leaflets by
Hamas during the First Intidafa, and finally, an examination of the political

platform(s) used by the Hamas-based List of Change and Reform party of the

2005-2006 Palestinian legislative elections. By analyzing this series of
documents that span a full 18 years, we can get a greater sense of the ways
Hamas has used and refined its frames and framing techniques over time to suit

its changing needs and appeal to its changing audience.

The Hamas Charter

The difficulties with studying movements such as Hamas are numerous.
The very nature of the movement requires a liberal amount of secrecy, and
creates a good deal of biases both for and against it. Examining Hamas’s official

charter, often referred to as The Covenant, provides such difficulties.
Assumptions, biases, and contradictions abound regarding who wrote, ratified,

and edited the document, and similar issues are prevalent concerning its
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message and how much the organization continues to believe in and act upon

that message.

There is very little about The Covenant that we know with a full measure
of certainty. One thing we do know is that the document was made public on
August 18, 1988, approximately nine months after the beginning of the First

Intifada, which introduced Hamas to the world (Tamimi, 2007, p. 147; Intelligence
and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies, 2006, p. 2).
According to Azzam Tamimi (2007), the document’s author “is believed to have
been Abd al-Fattah Dukham, one of the seven founders of Hamas and a long

time leader of the Palestinian Ikhwan," who “often acted as second-in-command

to Sheikh Ahmed Yassin” (Tamimi, 2007, p. 150). In a 2003 interview, Hamas
Political Bureau Chairman, Khalid Mishal, told Tamimi (2007) that “the Charter
was rushed out to what was perceived at the time to be a pressing need to

introduce the newly founded movement to the public” (p. 149). Khaled Hroub

(2006) makes a similar assertion, citing that the document was written “by one
individual and was made public without appropriate general Hamas consultation,
I

revision, or consensus...” (p. 33). Israeli analysts of Hamas, on the other hand,

tell a much different story. The Israeli-based Intelligence and Terrorism
Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S.) (2006) asserts that
the charter “was edited and approved by Ahmad Yassin [SIC],” and “is Hamas’s

most important ideological document..." (p. 2). Regardless of the contradictions
listed above, the Hamas charter provides a snapshot of the ideologies and
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framing that appealed, and continues to appeal, to at least some of the people in
the organization, as well as at least some of its prospective human resources.
Framing Mechanisms and Processes

The Hamas charter contains a total of seven sections, including five

chapters, an introduction, and postscript, all of which encompass 120
paragraphs. More than 30 of its paragraphs are Islamic scripture in the form of

Qur’anic and sunnic passages. Within its chapters, Hamas employs all forms of
frame components, including Benford and Snow’s diagnostic, prognostic, and
motivational components, as well as Gamson’s identity, injustice, and agency

components.
Frame Components. The document employs Benford and Snow’s
diagnostic component and Gamson’s identity and injustice components to

delineate the "we” and the “they," and places blame in its framing. The charter

opens with a passage from the Qur’an, with its first sentence stating that “Ye are

the best of Peoples, evolved for humanity, enjoining what is right, forbidding what
is wrong, and believing in Allah" (Charter, 1988, p. 122). This statement
identifies Hamas as Muslims who believe they hold the moral high ground in their
conflict, as shown by the portions claiming them to be “the best of Peoples" who

are “enjoining what is right,” and clearly delineates the “we.” The following
paragraph delineates the “they” by quoting Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan

al-Banna as stating “Israel will be established and will stay established until Islam

nullifies it...” (Charter, 1988, p. 122). This statement not only identifies who
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Hamas sees as the problem, it also uses Benford and Snow’s prognostic framing

in giving the solution. The charter further shows that Hamas also considers its

“we” as Palestinians, mujahids (freedom fighters) and fellow nationalists, while

also regarding “they” as Jews and Zionists, as well as imperialists, the
“Communist East,” and the “Capitalist” or “Crusading West,” whom it sees as
supporting its enemy. One of the most thorough and complete “we” and "they”

delineations of the charter (1988) states:
The Islamic Resistance Movement is a link in [a long] chain of the Jihad

against the Zionist occupation, which is connected and tied with the
initiation [of the Jihad] of the Martyr 'Izz al-Din al-Qassam and his Mujahid

brothers in 1936. And the chain continues on to connect and tie another
episode to add to the Jihad of the Palestinians and the Jihad of the Muslim
Brotherhood in the war of 1948 and the Jihad operation of the Muslim

Brotherhood in 1968 and thereafter (p. 124).
This statement clearly names Hamas and Muslims who have taken part in past
conflicts against Zionists and Israel as “we,” while simultaneously naming “the

Zionist occupation” as “they,” and recommending further jihad against it

Table 2 shows a breakdown of the diagnostic/identity-injustice
components found within the Hamas charter. While many of the references to
the words listed are literal, many others are implied through context.14

14 Throughout this study of documents, multiple references of the same word within the same
paragraph are counted as a single reference.
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Table 2. Diagnostic-Injustice Components in the
Hamas Charter
Frequency
%
Diagnostic/ldentityInjustice Component
*
Muslim

35

29.1

Palestinian

9

7.5

Mujahid

7

5.8

Others

5

4.1

Zionists

11

9.1

Jews

8

6.7

Israel

3

2.5

Others

9

7.5

“We”

"They”

* References to the name "Islamic Resistance
Movement” are not counted.

The charter blames part of the problems facing Palestinians, and the world in

general, on "the lack of the Islamic Spirit [that] has brought about distorted
judgment and absurd comprehension” (Charter, 1988, p. 125), and claims that

the only “solution to the Palestinian Problem” is “Jihad,” rather than "’Peaceful
Solutions’ and ‘International Conferences,’” which it claims are “a waste of time
and a kind of child’s play” (Charter, 1988, p. 126). Table 3 shows a breakdown

of the agency/prognostic-motivational components found within the Hamas

charter. As with the previous table, many of the references to the words listed
are literal, while many others are implied through context, and multiple
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references of the same word within the same paragraph are counted as a single

reference.

Table 3. Agency/Prognostic-Motivational Components
in the Charter
Agency/PrognosticMotivational Component

Frequency

%

Islam

16

13.3

Jihad

14

11.7

Table 4, below, shows that the Hamas charter makes extensive use of

diagnostic, identity, and injustice components, and considerably less use of
agency, prognostic, and motivational components.

Table 4. Comparison of Frame Components in the
Charter
Component

Frequency

%

Diagnostic/ldentity-lnjustice

87

N/A

Agency/PrognosticMotivational

30

N/A

Note: The frequency percentages are not applicable to this table
because some paragraphs contain multiple components.

There are nearly three times as many identity and injustice components as there

are agency, prognostic, and motivational components. These figures highly
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suggest that the primary motivation behind the content of the Hamas charter is to

identify and place blame for a perceived injustice, as well as to identify against
whom the perceived injustice has taken place, rather than placing an emphasis

on offering solutions to the perceived problem or motivating people to do
something about it

Frame Alignment Mechanisms and Processes. The frame alignment
processes used by Hamas in its charter are relatively few when compared to its

use of frame components, but are not at all subtle in the instances in which they
are used. For example, Hamas makes no attempt to mask its frame bridging,

opting instead, to embrace the tactic. The document unapologetically states,

“Nationalism, from the point of view of the Islamic Resistance Movement, is part

and parcel of religious ideology" (Charter, 1988, p. 125), and “is part of its
religion" (Charter, 1988, p. 126). The same can be said of its use of frame

amplification, which is done primarily through the use of passages from the

Qur’an and sunna. Further frame amplification takes place through the use of
shared history, such as references to Saladin and the Crusades, Izz ad-Din al-

Qassam’s 1930s rebellion, and the 1967 June War.
Hamas’s use of frame extension in its charter is much more rare and

subtle than its use of the other frame alignment processes. Frame extension

takes place in only three implied instances where the group states that other

movements are seen as favorable, “even if it disagrees with them on an issue or
viewpoint," provided they have “good intentions" (Charter, 1988, p. 129). Context
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suggests that those movements be both Islamic and nationalist. Interestingly,
the document states specifically that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)

is like a family member of Hamas, holding no ill will toward the group, but that,
due to its secular ideology, Hamas cannot fully support, nor will it become part of

the organization (Charter, 1988, pp. 130-131). Another noteworthy rejection of
alignment is seen in the charter’s criticism of Egypt’s removal “from the circle of
struggle” because of its agreement to the Camp David Accords of 1979 (Charter,

1988, p. 132). Such statements show a rejection of frame extension and

transformation, applying to the group’s previously stated Islamic beliefs and its
stated positions on international treaties.

Table 5. Frame Alignment Processes in the Charter
Alignment Process

Frequency

%

Bridging

6

5.0

Amplification

41

34.1

Extension

3

2.5

Transformation

N/A

N/A

Note.

Frame transformation is not applicable to the charter
because it is one of the first documents produced by
Hamas.

Table 5 shows the extent to which Hamas uses frame amplification as part

of its alignment process. More than 34% of its paragraphs include some form of
frame amplification, most of which is done using religious passages. This
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extensive use of religion would potentially make the document more palatable to

the Palestinian people, which, according to the Central Intelligence Agency’s
World Factbook, have an 87.1% Muslim combined makeup among the West
Bank15 and Gaza Strip.16 The further use of shared history, frame bridging, and

frame extension would potentially appeal to all Palestinians, including the
remaining 12.9% of the non-Muslim population, even if the non-Muslim portion

were only be seen as potential supporters and sympathizers of the group, rather
than potential members, who would obviously be exclusively Muslim.
Frame Resonance Mechanisms and Processes. Measuring and

quantifying frame resonance factors is not as easy as measuring and quantifying
frame components and alignment processes. One cannot simply read and
analyze a document and declare with any measure of certainty how or what other

people will or did think about it. Nor can the diffusion factor be accurately
measured', as we simply do not know who might have told whom about it. As

articulated by Hank Johnston (2005, p. 238), “Frames are mental constructs, not

observable behaviors.” He goes on to mention that the problems inherent in

frame analysis are operational measurement and imprecision (Johnston, 2005, p.
239), which would certainly apply to quantifying the ways people might react to

15 See “People and Society” in “West Bank.” Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook.
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/we.html . (Accessed June 22,
2012)
16 See “People and Society in “Gaza Strip." Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook.
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gz.htmi. (Accessed June 22,
2012)
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frames. Furthermore, the difficulties of measuring frame resonance are

compounded by the fact that Hamas does not make public its membership
numbers, nor do all of its human resources actively identify themselves as such;
and that is especially true of the period of time in which the charter was produced

and originally distributed. As a result, without actively polling individuals on the

ways they reacted to the Hamas charter during the First Intifada, we cannot

obtain a quantified measurement of that reaction, and, therefore, cannot quantify

the document’s resonance factors.
There are, however, some key points regarding the frame resonance of
I

the Hamas charter that can be inferred by content, especially in the resonant

factor of frame credibility. For example, as previously mentioned, the charter

makes extensive use of Islamic passages from the Qur’an, giving the document a

potentially greater resonant quality among fellow Muslims. Furthermore, the
charter calls for social welfare that “provid[es] aid to everyone who is in need of
it, be it material, or spiritual, or collective cooperation to complete some work,”

(Charter, 1988, p. 129) which Ahmed Yassin and the Islamic Center had been
doing for years. The use of the religious passages and calls for social welfare

show that Hamas was not only “practicing what it preached,” but also “preaching
what it practiced.” As previously mentioned, this enhances both the credibility of

the frame, as well as the credibility of the frame producer. The charter’s use of

the shared history of Palestinian suffering and invasions by outside forces tells as
much about its potential appeal to popular wisdom as it does of its measurable
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frame amplification. So too do its delineations of “we" and other measures of
diagnostic, identity, and injustice components tell of its relativity to real people

and the real world in which they live.
Ironically, another resonant quality of the Hamas charter, the credibility of

the frame producer, does not come from the document itself, or even from
Hamas. Rather, it comes from those who emphasize Ahmed Yassin’s potential
role in producing the document. While many in Hamas “question the idea of the

1988 document as a founding charter” and regard it as a “mistake" (Caridi, 2009,

pp. 103, 104), Israel insists it was “edited and approved” by the movement’s well

loved, spiritual leader (Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the
Center for Special Studies, 2006, p. 2). Such a claim serves to potentially

enhance the document’s credibility with followers of Yassin.
Recurring Themes. There are multiple themes present within the Hamas
charter. Without a doubt, its primary theme is Islam. As shown in Table 6, more

than 70% of the paragraphs within the document contain some form of reference

to Muslims or Islam, with more than 25% of them being Islamic scripture. There
are, however, other overlying and underlying themes present within the

document Drawing largely from the primary Islamic theme is the secondary

theme of obligation. The charter makes it clear in more than 10% of its
paragraphs that Muslims, Palestinians, and Arabs have an obligation to protect
the land of Palestine, which it considers an Islamic waqf (property endowment)

(Charter, 1988, p. 125), from the Zionist “invaders” (Charter, 1988, p. 133). The
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charter (1998, pp. 126-7) states, “When an enemy occupies some of the Muslim
lands, Jihad becomes obligatory for every Muslim.”

Table 6. Primary Themes of the Hamas
Charter
Theme

Frequency

%

Islam

85

70.8

Obligation

13

10.8

Loyalty

25

20.8

A more underlying theme is that of loyalty. The charter lays out who
does—and does not—deserve the loyalty of Muslims, Palestinians, and the Arab

world. In it, Hamas declares its “loyalty to Allah” (Charter, 1988, p. 124), while

stating it will give its support to other nationalist movements, provided they do not
give their “loyalty to the Communist East or Crusading West” (Charter, 1988, p.
130). There are only four direct references to loyalty in the document. There
are, however, other indirect and implied references. For example, the document

states that Hamas “welcomes all Muslims who adopt its doctrines and ideology,
enact its program, guard its secrets, and desire to join its ranks to perform the

obligation and receive their reward from Allah” (Charter, 1988, p. 123). In

another example, Hamas castigates Egypt for its role in the 1979 Camp David

agreement, stating that the Arab state has been “removed... from the circle of
struggle” in a move Hamas regards as “treason” (Charter, 1988, p. 132).
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Conclusions Regarding the Charter
The particular use of framing mechanisms and processes in the Hamas

charter show that the primary purpose of the document is to distinguish Hamas
from its rival, the Palestinian Liberation Organization. Hamas uses identity and

agency components of a frame to display its Islamic nature. It bridges Islam with
nationalism and then amplifies those frames with Islamic passages and shared

nationalist history, maximizing the charter’s resonant factors with multiple
demographics within its pool of existing and potential human resources. Its latent

use of the themes of obligation and loyalty are overshadowed only by its blatant
use of Islamic themes in an attempt to show that the PLO does not meet its

obligations to the Palestinian cause, nor is it loyal to that cause. Such varied
themes also help to maximize the resonant qualities of the document with those

potential human resources that were disillusioned and dissatisfied with the

practices and ideologies with the Hamas rival. The charter shows that Hamas
wants to be spokesman for the “Islamic Trust” (waqf) of Palestine (Charter, 1988,

p. 125), challenging the PLO forthat role, which it had held virtually unchallenged
since the 1974 Rabat Declaration, in which Arab leaders recognized the PLO as

“the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people..." (Smith, 2010, p.
326).

Hamas’s First Intifada Leaflets

Beside its official charter, Hamas produced an extensive series of leaflets
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that the movement distributed to the Palestinian population throughout the

entirety of the First Intifada. The complications with studying the leaflets
produced by Hamas during the First Intifada are almost as numerous as those of
the Hamas charter. While there have been multiple works on the movement that
reference various leaflets, there are few that provide any type of analysis or

information of them as a collection. Shaul Misha! and Reuben Aharoni did

perhaps the most detailed analysis of collected Hamas leaflets from the First
Intifada in their 1994 book, Speaking stones: Communiques from the Intifada
Underground. Even this detailed source, however, is lacking. Mishal and
Aharoni (1994, pp. 28-29) cite that Hamas put out 33 leaflets in the first year of

the Intifada and 18 in the second year ofthe conflict. Yet, the authors do not give
any indication how many leaflets were produced in the years that followed, nor
do they provide a complete collection ofthe documents in their work.

There is also not much consensus among historians and scholars ofthe
movement regarding the leaflets, especially when they were first published and
distributed to the public. It is widely believed that Hamas introduced itself to the

world in its initial leaflet. Author Zaki Chehab (2007, p. 25) claims that Hamas
founder, Ahmed Yassin, has stated that the movement “issued its first statement

on 14 December [1987].” Author Khaled Hroub (2006, p. 12) echoes that
sentiment, writing that “Hamas came into being officially on 14 December 1987,

declaring itself in an official communique..." Author Jonathan Schanzer (2008, p.
24) asserts that the time ofthe first leaflet ranges from December 14, 1987 to
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February 11, 1988. Alternatively, authors Ze’ev Sciff and Ehud Ya’ari (1989, p.
222) claim that Hamas was created in February 1988, which is supported by

historian Charles D. Smith (2010, p. 410). In direct contradiction to his own
claim, however, Smith (2010, p. 430) dates the first Hamas leaflet as January of

1988, which is supported by Mishal and Aharoni (1994, p. 201). Compounding

the issue is the fact that Hamas leaflets were not always dated, and were not
sequentially numbered until leaflet number 21, which was released in May 1988

(Mishal & Aharoni, 1994, p. 28). That date and leaflet number, however, is only

accurate if Mishal and Aharoni are correct in their initial dating assertions.
Regardless of when Hamas leaflets were first printed and distributed,
historians generally agree that the homemade communiques were originally

produced and primarily distributed in the Gaza Strip until October 1988, when

leaflet number 30 was produced and also distributed in the West Bank (Schiff &
Ya’ari, 1989, p. 238; Mishal & Aharoni, 1994, pp. 28, 29; Chehab, 2007, pp. 26,
28). As with the claims regarding the Hamas charter, there are assertions that all
I

leaflet content required the approval of Hamas leader Ahmed Yassin (Schiff &

Ya’ari , 1989, p. 222; Mishal & Sela, 2000, p. 55). But whenever and wherever

the leaflets were produced and whoever wrote and approved them, like the
Hamas charter, the leaflets provide a series of virtual snapshots that give a
!

glimpse of the professed actions, ideologies, and framing that appealed to at

least some of the existing and potential human resources of Hamas during the

First Intifada.
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Framing Mechanisms and Processes

Hamas’s leaflets are structured much differently than its charter. The
charter is made up of 120 paragraphs that cover several pages. By contrast, the

individual leaflets are often only about a dozen paragraphs that cover only a
couple pages. Regardless of their lack of comparable scale, however, the
leaflets contain the same framing processes and mechanisms found in the much

larger charter.17
Frame Components. The Hamas First Intifada leaflets contain all of the

components of a frame, including delineations of “we” and “they”, as well as
diagnostic and agency components that diagnose a perceived problem and
propose an action to correct it. As with the Hamas charter, the Hamas leaflets

commonly define “we” as Palestinians, Muslims, and mujahids. Unlike the

charter, however, the leaflets add a new element to their “we” delineation” in the
form of “murabitun”. As translated by Mishal and Aharoni (1994, p. 201), the
term is defined as “Muslims who settled in outlying areas during the initial period

of the Muslim conquests in order to defend the borders.” In the context in which

it routinely used, beginning with Leaflet No. 1,18 the term implies that modern
Palestinians are also defending the borders of Islam from its enemies, as well as

17 Due to the lack of access to many of Hamas’s leaflets from the First Intifada, accurate
quantification of their framing mechanisms and processes is neither possible, nor would it be
meaningful for the purposes of this research. They have been, therefore, only subject to qualified
analysis.
18 As numerically marked by Mishal and Aharoni.
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making them a part of Hamas’s expansion of Islamic territory. Such a term and
definition would not likely be lost on the Arabic-speaking Muslims of the region,

and would serve as a resonant quality of shared understanding and history.
The leaflets, like the charter, also commonly define “they” as Jews, Israel,

and Zionists, as well as others that include the PLO and Fatah, the United States

and the West, and Arab states and leaders. The leaflets, however, place a
greater emphasis than the charter when identifying particular “they” categories

and use much greater emotive and resonant rhetoric than that of the charter. In

a prime example of diagnostic framing, Leaflet No. 4 (Mishal & Aharoni, 1994, p.
208) states:

An army equipped from head to foot is fighting our weaponless people.
Tanks, armored vehicles, and airplanes pursue the inhabitants. Ingenious

toxic bombs are hurled at our masses, sometimes from airplanes and

sometimes by soldiers. Curfew is imposed on towns, villages, and camps;
houses are broken into by day and by night, and all the furniture smashed;
women are intimidated and children are terrorized; they are pursued,

arrested, and tortured.... The plunderer has revealed his malice and
unmasked his true face, wielding his iron fist to impose a death sentence

on the liberty and honor of our people.

This statement articulates some of the real world problems experienced by many

Palestinians during the First Intifada. The leaflet goes on to name who is

responsible for such reprehensible acts. It states, “These criminal methods are
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clear proof of the Jews’ hatred and despotism” (Mishal & Aharoni, 1994, p. 209).
Hamas then instructs people to “fortify” their homes, to “organize guards”, and to

“equip [themselves] with stones, sticks, axes, and knives", as well as to be aware
of “suspicious” leaflets from Hamas rivals “expressing] fear at the rising power of

religious reactionaries" and “calling for a halt to the uprising” (Mishal & Aharoni,
1994, pp. 209-210). Other leaflets make even greater admonition against Hamas

rivals. For example, in an April 1990 “Special Leaflet” that informs Palestinians
of the injustices placed upon imprisoned Hamas members by the rival Fatah
faction. The leaflet claims that Fatah members have shown “contempt for the

sanctity of Islam”, have perpetrated acts of violence against Hamas members,

and have even denied the existence of Hamas. The leaflet compares Fatah

members to other “enemies of Islam”, presumably Zionists (Mishal & Aharoni,
1994, pp. 274-277). It goes on to call for “a stop to this distress” and advises

unity among all Palestinians (Mishal & Aharoni, 1994, p. 277).
The call for unity against Israel is also placed upon the people of Egypt

and other Arab states. For example, the second paragraph of Leaflet No. 1

(Mishal & Aharoni, 1994, pp. 201-202) asks:
What has happened to you, O rulers of Egypt? Were you asleep in the
period of the treaty of shame and surrender, the Camp David treaty? Has
your national zealousness died and your pride run out while the Jews daily
perpetrate grave and base crimes against the people and the children?
And you, O army of Egypt, O descendants of Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi...,
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what has happened? Have the rulers paralyzed your movement and

stripped you of your power, making you so impotent that even the
usurpers are no longer frightened of you?
The context of this statement shows that Hamas regards the rulers and military of

Egypt as a part of “they" to whom Hamas is opposed. The leaflet goes on to

state that the “Muslim Palestinian people rejects the surrender solutions” and
“accuses all who seek this [solution] of weaving a plot against its rights and its

sacred national cause” (Mishal & Aharoni, 1994, p. 202).
Hamas’s leaflets from the First Intifada also employ extensive agency
components. As with the charter, the primary form of agency called for by

Hamas is jihad and a return to Islam. In Leaflet No. 1 (Mishal & Aharoni, 1994,

pp. 201-202), the movement states, “Only Islam can break the Jews and destroy

their dream,” and that “Liberation will not be complete without sacrifice, blood,

and jihad that continues until victory.” This sentiment is repeated often in
Hamas’s leaflet rhetoric. Hamas also routinely calls for civil disobedience in the
form of strikes against Israeli employers, boycotts against Israeli businesses, and

protests against Israeli occupation and aggression. Such calls often coincide
with important dates, such as the start of Ramadan or historic battles. For

example, the “action plans” in Leaflet No. 39 (Mishal & Aharoni, 1994, p. 260) call
for, among other things:

1. To designate the first day of Ramadan as a day of escalation and

confrontation marking the onset of the month of conquests and
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victories.
2. A general strike on Saturday, April 8,1989—marking the day on which
the mujahid ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Husseini and his comrades fell in the

Battle of the Qastel.

3. A general strike on Sunday, April 9,1989—marking the advent of the
5th month in the second year of the blessed uprising. The uprising
should be escalated to commemorate the massacre at Deir Yassin by

the Jewish terrorists.
4. Wednesday, April 12, 1989—A day for calling out "Allah akbaF and

reading the Qur’an aloud from the mosques and the roofs of houses to

mark the opening of fire at the worshippers in al-Aqsa mosque in 1982.

Dates and events such as these remain important to the shared history and
culture of Muslims and the Palestinian people, who would be well aware of their
significance.

Another form of agency called for in the Hamas leaflets is education.
Multiple leaflets make reference to educating not only the youth of Palestine, but
also its general population. For example, Leaflet No. 8 (Mishal & Aharoni, 1994,

p. 220) reminds Palestinians, “Everyone must know that activity against the
occupation does not conflict with education but is parallel to it. We must be
armed with education." Leaflet No. 45 (Mishal & Aharoni, 1994, pp. 262-264)
goes even further, with the entire pamphlet being devoted to education, referring

to pupils as “the beacons of knowledge, the way of integrity and light, [and] the
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hopes of this nation..." It calls on Palestinians to ignore the Israeli closure of

schools and instructs “all the students and teachers to go to schools this

Saturday, July 22, 1989, and to conduct regular classes out of concern for the

well-being ofthe educational process” (Mishal & Aharoni, 1994, pp. 263-264).
Frame Alignment Mechanisms and Processes. Like the Hamas charter,
its leaflets from the First Intifada make overt and extensive use of the frame
alignment process of amplification, while largely ignoring other alignment

processes, such as bridging, extension, and transformation. The primary frame

amplification techniques employed by Hamas are the use of Islamic and historic
references. The movement begins almost all of its leaflets with the phrase “In the
name of Allah the merciful and compassionate," which is then followed by a
passage from the Qur’an that relates to the message being put forth in that

particular pamphlet (Mishal & Aharoni, 1994). Passages from the Qur’an and

sunna are also placed throughout the documents. In addition, many of the
leaflets are dated with both the Muslim and traditional Western calendar systems.

Hamas leaflets also draw upon shared history as part of their frame

amplification processes. In them, Palestinians are reminded of historic people
and events that range from the time of Muhammad to the present day. Leaflets
regularly refer to Palestinians as descendants of such people as Abu ‘Ubayda,

Ma'ad Bin Jabal, and Khalid Ibn al-Walid, referring to 7th century figures
important to the Islamic faith (Mishal & Aharoni, 1994, pp. 208, 212). More
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recent references include the 1917 Balfour Declaration, the 1948 formation of the
State of Israel, and the 1967 Six Day/June War.
Frame Resonance Mechanisms and Processes. The same problems with

measuring the frame resonance factors in the Hamas charter are present when

attempting to measure the resonance factors in the Hamas leaflets. While we

can assume, based on the fact that Hamas managed to survive and grow as an
organization during the time of the First Intifada, without having access to the

actual readers of the documents, we cannot know with any amount of certainty
how everyone reacted to them. Similarly, while we can assume, by the nature of
the documents, themselves, as well as the method of distribution, that diffusion of

the leaflets was greater than that of the charter. .Without having the actual

numbers of how many leaflets were produced and distributed, however,

assumption is all that we can do.

But, like the charter, there are certain points regarding the resonance of
the documents that can be pointed out. The extensive use of Islamic passages
would certainly make the documents more resonant with Palestinian Muslims;

especially when compared to the secular nature of Hamas’s primary rival, Fatah.
Equally important, the Islamic passages combined with the calls to return to
Islam show that Hamas is willing to practice what it preaches, strengthening the

credibility of the frame and the frame producers. Furthermore, Hamas’s graphic
rhetoric regarding the actions of Israel increase the relativity of the documents to

the real world that Palestinians were facing at the time. Finally, the assertion that
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Ahmed Yassin had a hand in producing, editing, and approving leaflet content
strengthens the resonance factor of the leaflets with the followers of the group’s

spiritual leader.
Recurring Themes. There are two primary themes that are repeated

throughout Hamas’s First Intifada leaflets: Islam and resistance. As previously
mentioned, the leaflets are introduced with Islamic references to Allah and are
laced with repeated passages from the Qur’an and include the Islamic calendar

in its dating. Equally obvious are the numerous calls for resistance against
Israeli occupation and Western influence. Leaflets regularly encourage
Palestinians to “escalate [the struggle] from day to day” and to “let the uprising

continue” (Mishal & Aharoni, 1994, pp. 207, 223). While the term jihad is used in

multiple leaflets, the idea of multi-faceted resistance has taken its place as a
recurring theme, in order to, perhaps, be more palatable to a greater pool of

potential human resources, some of which may not be Muslim or may not be
attracted to calls for outright violence.

A more underlying theme in the Hamas leaflets is that of unity; unity
among Palestinians, in general, as well as unity among the numerous Palestinian
factions. Regarding the former, for example, Leaflet No. 8 makes multiple overt
calls for Palestinian unity, as well as some that are less obvious. The pamphlet
calls for “compassion... between people, between neighbors, rich and poor,
buyer and seller...” and asks that “leasers... release tenants from their burden [of

paying rent] to the extent possible” while also encouraging tenants to “not delay a
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payment due to the owners...” (Mishal & Aharoni, 1994, pp. 216-220). Of
course, Hamas’s idea of unity regarding the latter equates to other factions,
namely Fatah, unifying with Hamas’s ideas, rather than Hamas meeting the ideas

of others, or even meeting them half way. Regarding both the Palestinian and

Arab people, Leaflet No. 8 (Mishal & Aharoni, 1994, p. 218) asks “when did it
have unity without Islam?"
Conclusions Regarding the Leaflets

The use of framing mechanisms and processes in Hamas’s First Intifada

leaflets shows a greater interest on agency than on defining Hamas or its rivals.

While there is certainly no shortage of identity and diagnostic components,
agency and motivational components are much more obvious and prevalent.
The extensive use of Islam as an amplification mechanism and overt theme

aligns the frames to existing and potential Muslim human resources, while the
themes of resistance and unity serve to try and draw in the remaining pool of

potential human resources. The leaflets show that Hamas wants to be the

unofficial leader of the uprising, issuing warnings for Palestinians not to be drawn
in by rival leaflets or alternative protest dates, as well as directly admonishing

such rivals as Fatah and Arab leaders who might try and sway influence over
human resources away from Hamas.

The Hamas Election Manifesto
The election manifesto for the Hamas-based List of Change and Reform
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party that was introduced as part of the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections

show a stark contrast to its documents produced during the First Intifada more
than 15 years before. Analysis of the 2006 election manifesto put out by Hamas

for the Palestinian elections that year do not pose the same problems as those of

the previous documents analyzed in this research. For example, there are no
contradictory claims of authorship or importance of the document, as it is

believed that it was written with considerable forethought and internal discussion
by Hamas leadership, rather than claims of micromanagement from a single and
often controversial individual (Caridi, 2009, p. 107). That does not, however,
mean that there are not some of the same inconsistencies in our knowledge of

the document. One such inconsistency is the date in which it was first delivered
to the public. Schanzer (2008, p. 96) asserts that the election manifesto was
dated January 25, 2006, which seems unlikely considering that is the date of the

election. Alternatively, the British Broadcasting Corporation reported on the
publication of the document on January 12, 2006.19 Most other authors, wisely,
do not attempt to date the document or discuss its creators.

The most important features of the 2006 election manifesto, however, are
not when it was published and distributed, but the reaction people had to it once

it was. Like the charter and First intifada leaflets, the election platform of Hamas
provides a snapshot of the movement’s professed ideologies and use of framing

19 See “Hamas reveals election manifesto,” January 12, 2006, BBC News,
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/middle_east/4606482.stm (Accessed July 8, 2012).
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at that time. Perhaps even more importantly, unlike the charter and leaflets, the
results of the 2006 election provide a reasonably measurable assessment of the

document’s resonance among the movement’s existing and potential human
resources.

Framing Mechanisms and Processes
The 2006 election manifesto of Hamas is made up of eighteen sections,

plus an introduction and conclusions, with a total of 220 paragraphs. Like the
Hamas charter and First Intifada leaflets, the election manifesto contains all of

the various components of a frame. Unlike those previous documents, which

focus primarily on frame amplification, it also contains a wide variety of frame
alignment strategies, including frame bridging, frame extension, and frame

transformation.

Frame Components. Hamas’s 2006 election manifesto immediately
introduces the organization’s “we” delineations and agency components. In fact,

the name of the Hamas political party, alone—List of Change and Reform—bears

a great deal of the movement’s proposed agency. Its first paragraph is a
passage from the Qur’an that states, “...my success [in my task] can only come

from Allah...” (Tamimi, 2007, p. 292). This agency component is followed in the
second paragraph by declarations that Hamas believes it is its “responsibility”

and “duty” to “reform the Palestinian reality... from the ills of corruption... in the

hope of reinforcing national unity...” (Tamimi, 2007, p. 292). These statements

show that Hamas is still committed to its previously-stated positions that Islam
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and unity are significant parts of its agency, and that it represents the interests of

the Palestinian people. The document, however, does introduce some new
identity components that are not as broadly articulated in its charter or leaflets:

citizens, corruption, and occupation, as well as a new agency component:
politics.

Table 7. Diagnostic-Injustice Components in the
Election Manifesto
Frequency

%

18

8.2

Palestinian

53

24.1

Mujahid

0

0

Others

'3

1.4

Citizens

13

5.9

Zionists

4

1.8

Jews

0

0

Israel

4

1.8

Other

3

1.4

Corruption

9

4.1

Occupation

10

4.5

Diagnostic/ldentityInjustice Component
Muslim

"We”

“They”

Table 7 shows the frequency of the document’s individual and collective
diagnostic and identity components in relation to those of previously analyzed

documents. Nearly 40% of the document’s 220 paragraphs contain some form of
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“we” delineation, which is a relatively close comparison to the 46.7% found in the
charter. While the Hamas charter focused, largely, on defining “we” as "Muslim”,
with the “Palestinian” delineation being secondary, the Hamas election manifesto

reverses that trend, making “Palestinian" the primary “we" delineation and
“Muslim” being secondary. Furthermore, the prior “we" delineation of “mujahid”

does not appear at all in the document, seemingly being replaced by the more
generic delineation of “citizen”.

Another striking contrast from previous documents is the definition of

“they”, which made up over 25% ofthe charter. By contrast, delineations of
“they” make up less than 14% ofthe election manifesto, with the terms “Zionist"
and “Israel” being sparsely used, and “Jews” not appearing anywhere in the
document. These “they” identity components have been largely replaced by the
injustice components “corruption” and “occupation,” removing the idea of who is

causing the perceived problems, and replacing it with the definition ofthe
perceived problem.
These same trends carry over into the document’s use of agency and
motivational frame components, which are present in nearly every paragraph.

Table 8 shows the frequency ofthe document’s primary agency components,
which are “reform” and “resistance and liberation”, as well as some mentioned in
the charter and First Intifada leaflets. Only 25% of the charter’s paragraphs

contain an agency or motivational frame component. Further contrasts between
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the Hamas charter and its election manifesto abound. For example, while the
document leads with a reference to an Islamic agency component, Islam is not

the primary form of agency listed throughout the document.

Table 8. Agency/Prognostic-Motivational
Components in the Election Manifesto
Agency/PrognosticMotivational Component
Islam

Frequency

%

13

5.9

Jihad

3

1.3

Reform

28

12.7

Unity

16

7.3

Resistance/Liberation'

16

7.3

Education

22

10.0

Similarly, the once-used agency component of jihad is sparsely used in the
election manifesto. This does not, however, suggest that Hamas has entirely

changed its position regarding its style of resistance. As part of its stated

“essential principles”, the movement still reserves the “right... to end the

occupation by using ail available means, including armed resistance” (Tamimi,
2007, pp. 293-294). This change suggests that Hamas recognized the violent
and solely Islamic nature of the term “jihad’ and wanted to replace it with a more

all-encompassing idea that might appeal to a greater number of prospective

human resources, which could include non-Muslims interested in taking part in
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armed resistance, as well as Muslims and non-Muslims interested in more
peaceful means of resistance. Similarly, the move from Islam as its primary
agency component to a wider variety of agency components suggests that
Hamas is aware that Islam, alone, cannot solve all of the perceived problems

facing the Palestinian people, and that, as a political party, it must have -a more

all-encompassing platform to address those particular issues in order to attract
potential human resources to whom those issues are important.
Frame Alignment Mechanisms and Processes. The 2006 election

manifesto employs all four frame alignment processes, as shown in Table 9.

Table 9. Frame Alignment Processes in the
Election Manifesto
Alignment Process

Frequency

%

Bridging

, 13

5.9

Amplification

21

9.5

Extension

8

3.6

Transformation

9

4.0

Like the Hamas charter and First Intifada leaflets, it contains a liberal amount of
frame amplification. The document, as with the others, amplifies many of its
frames with the use of passages from the Qur’an and other Islamic texts. Its

other frame amplification techniques, however, are much more subtle, using
specific wording to potentially heighten the emotional response of the reader and
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to try to appeal to as many viewers as possible—including those outside of its
electorate.20 For example, one passage in the document calls for the party to

“immunize” the youth of Palestine “against corruption,” as if the vice is an
infectious virus for which Hamas is the cure (Tamimi, 2007, p. 308). Other

sections of the manifesto call for “separation among the three powers: the
legislative, the executive, and the judiciary" (Tamimi, 2007, p. 299), and also
makes reference to “inalienable rights” of Palestinians that “are fixed and cannot
be compromised by any political concessions” (Tamimi, 2007, p. 294). Being so

closely related to specific wording in such American documents as the

constitution and Declaration of Independence, such wording in the Hamas
document suggests the possibility that it is trying to appeal to American and
Western sensibilities and extend its pool of potential human resources to a

greater international level.
Unlike prior Hamas documents, its election manifesto also contains

generous quantities of frame bridging, frame extension, and frame
transformation. For example, its frame bridging techniques include the bridging

of such ideas as “Divine religions and international law” (Tamimi, 2007, p. 297),
“individual and community rights” (Tamimi, 2007, p. 301), and “the social and

political stability of both the family and society” (Tamimi, 2007, p. 303). The
election manifesto also shows the extension of the movement’s previously-stated

20 It must be noted that it is possible that some of the subtle frame amplification in the document
could be the result of wording used in its translation, rather than by original intent by Hamas.
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Islamocentric policies that were once only extended to others that resided “in the

shadow of Islam" (Charter, 1988, p. 124). For example, the document makes a

point to call for “preserving Palestinian Islamic and Christian endowment
properties,” as well as the call to “Form a national parliamentary committee to

inspect the dispensing of Palestinian endowment funds, both Islamic and
Christian...” (Tamimi, 2007, pp. 296, 298). While such extension processes can

be risky, they are an obvious attempt by Hamas to try and maximize its frame
resonance with the greatest amount of people. This point suggests that Hamas’s

attempt to succeed in the formal democratic political process takes precedence

over ideas of hardline message discipline.
The final and potentially most influential frame alignment process in the

2006 election manifesto is that of frame transformation, most of which take the
form of references to participation in the formal political process. The fact that

Hamas had never before taken part in formal elections makes the very existence
of its 2006 manifesto a transformative document, as a whole. Hamas, in
seemingly full realization of that fact, is quick to try and lessen true believer

criticism of its frame transformation by mentioning in the document’s introduction
that the movement sees its participation in the election as falling “within the
framework of the comprehensive program for the liberation of Palestine,” and

points out, in the document’s conclusion, that it is taking part in the election
because “The blessed al-Aqsa Intifada has created new facts on the ground that

have rendered the Oslo program a thing of the past” (Tamimi, 2007, pp. 292;
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)

315). Statements such as these allow Hamas to transform its frames, while
attempting to not have a negative effect on the credibility of the frame or frame

makers.
Frame Resonance Mechanisms and Processes. Unlike those of the
Hamas charter and First Intifada leaflets, the frame resonance factors of its 2006

election manifesto are somewhat easier to quantify. Records21*show that

Hamas’s List of Change and Reform party received a total of 440,409 votes, or
44.45% of the total 1,042,424 electorates that participated in the 2006

Palestinian legislative elections (“The final results for the electoral lists”, 2006).

Due to the fact that not all Palestinians were permitted or chose to take part in
the election process, these figures in no way reflect the total number of people
with whom the election manifesto resonated. Nor do they begin to shed light on

its resonance with those outside the region who were ineligible to vote. They do,

however, offer a quantified minimum figure for the document’s frame resonance.
Simply stated, Hamas’s 2006 election manifesto, either in part or in its entirety,

resonated with at least 440,409 people.

21 While continuing to offer such information for other elections, both before and since 2006, the
Palestinian Authority no longer offers English translations of statistical information regarding the
2006 legislative elections on its official elections website. Such information can still be found
through Internet page archive services, although that is subject to change at any time without
notice and at the discretion of the archiving service. See
http://web.archive.Org/web/20081029054121/http://www.elections.ps/pdf/Final_Results_PLC_Su
mmary_Lists_Seats_2_En.pdf

102

The factors that went into such resonance are relatively few, yet obviously

very powerful. First, the 2004 death of long-time spiritual and charismatic leader,

Ahmed Yassin does not appear to have decreased the credibility of Hamas
among the Palestinian Muslim population. Although relatively sparse, the

document’s multiple references to Islam and Islamic principles, combined with
Hamas’s reputation as an Islamic organization increase the credibility of the

frame and the frame producers, and, as such, increases the resonance of the
manifesto with existing and potential Muslim human resources.

Next, the document’s identity and agency components make it relative to
the real people living in Palestine, as well as the real world in which they live.

Hamas’s List of Change and Reform, as its name suggests, ran on a platform

against the perceived corruption that was ripe within the Palestinian Authority. A
January 2006 Gallup poll of 1,000 Palestinians found that 79% of those polled
believed that “widespread corruption” was present in the Palestinian
government.22 Similar findings were reflected in a February 2006 poll by the

Jerusalem Media & Communication Center, which found that 72% of those polled

said “that they consider the performance of the previous Palestinian Legislative
Council ‘bad’ or ‘very bad.’”23 Concluding whether or not such levels of

22

See Lydia Saad, “Gallup Palestinian Survey Reveals Broad Discontent With Status Quo,”
January 27, 2006, Gallup, http://www.gallup.com/poll/21163/gallup-palestinian-survey-revealsbroad-discontent-status-quo.aspx

23 See Angela Stephens, “Most Palestinians Believe Hamas Should Change its Position on
Eliminating Israel,” March 2, 2006, WorldPublicOpinion.org,
http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brmiddleeastnafricara/173.php
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corruption were indeed present in that body is not within the scope of this

research. Nevertheless, the above statistics show that many Palestinians
believed that it was, and popular belief does not have to be accurate in order to

be popular.
Finally, the level of diffusion enjoyed by the document must have surely
attributed to its resonance with existing and potential human resources. While

we can assume that prior forms of diffusion, such as that of pamphlet distribution

and word-of-mouth, were in action with the diffusion ofthe election manifesto, we

can also assume there were other, more wide-reaching mediums that were
involved. Unlike the years during the First Intifada (1988-1993), Hamas was not

limited to such basic forms of diffusion in 2006, when it had a well-established

media wing that had multiple newspaper outlets and Internet websites by which

to convey its message to existing and potential human resources.
Recurring Themes. As with the Hamas charter and leaflets, there are

multiple themes within the 2006 election manifesto, as shown in Table 10.

Table 10. Primary Themes ofthe Election
Manifesto
Theme

Frequency

%.

Reform

21

9.5

National Unity

31

14.1

Populism

56

25.5
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Naturally, with the party name “List of Change and Reform,” one of the

document’s primary themes is reform. While the idea of change is certainly
widespread throughout the document, specific and implied references to reform
are made more obvious, making up nearly 10% of the document’s paragraphs,

and, as such, have more of a thematic presence than that of the more general

idea of change.
Another of the document’s primary themes is that of national unity. A full
14% of the manifesto’s paragraphs contain some form of overt or implied

reference to national unity. The opening paragraph of its introductory section
declares that Hamas believes it is its “responsibility” and “duty” to “reinforc[e]

national unity and bolster internal Palestinian ranks...” (Tamimi, 2007, p. 292).
Such sentiment is repeated throughout the document with specific references to

national unity, as well as references to “the establishment of the Palestinian

independent state” (Tamimi, 2007, p. 292) and citizenship.

A less obvious, yet more prevalent theme is that of populism. The term is
not found in any part of the manifesto, but is implied in more than 25% of its
paragraphs. According to Robert S. Jansen (2011), the term traditionally

“applies] to any person, movement, or regime that makes claims by appealing to

ordinary (i.e.,non-elite) people,” while “imply[ing] that the accused is corrupt,
undemocratic, or cynically opportunistic” (pp. 76-77). Jansen (2011) goes on to

allege that the term is too generalized, asserting, rather, that the idea of populist
mobilization “combin[es] popular mobilization with populist rhetoric," and is a
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more “a flexible way of animating political support,” defining it as “any sustained,

large-scale political project that mobilizes ordinarily marginalized social sectors

into publicly visible and contentious political action, while articulating an anti-elite,
nationalist rhetoric that valorizes ordinary people" (p. 82). Regardless of which
definition of the term is applied, it is undeniable that Hamas’s election manifesto

meets either the traditional definition of populism or Jansen’s idea of populist
mobilization.
Conclusions Regarding the Election Manifesto

The use of framing mechanisms and processes in Hamas’s 2006 election

manifesto show that the organization continues to be more interested in defining
itself and its potential human resources that it is in defining its opposition, while

also showing an interest in altering those definitions from their previously specific
nature to more general, all-encompassing categories. Similarly, its agency

components have taken on a more generalized and more peaceful nature, rather
than focusing largely on direct and often violent conflict. Finally, its frame
alignment processes have been changed from near-solely amplification to

include bridging, extension, and transformation, displaying a more pragmatic and
inclusive resonance strategy. Such resonance is further amplified by its
overarching themes of reform, unity, and populism. When taken together, these

points show the extent to which Hamas is willing to go in order to be successful
in the formal political process and potentially take control of the Palestinian

Authority from its rival, Fatah.
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Conclusion
The Hamas charter, its First Intifada leaflets, and its 2006 election
manifesto all contain the various forms of collective action framing mechanisms

and processes. All make use of identity and agency components, as well as
multiple frame alignment strategies that help to increase their overall frame

resonance. And their use of varying themes shows a willingness to alter its
message over time in order to appeal to a changing audience and maximize its

appeal to potential human resources.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Detailed analysis of Hamas’s primary source documents show that the

socio-political movement employs a wide variety of collective action framing
mechanisms and processes in order to attract and maintain its human resources.
Identity frame components help Hamas label itself and its enemies, as well as

classify perceived injustices against the Palestinian people. Meanwhile, agency
frame components motivate its human resources in what actions to take to

correct the perceived injustices inflicted by perceived enemies. At the same
time, frame alignment mechanisms and processes help Hamas to make its
message to the masses more meaningful to more people, while frame resonance

mechanisms and processes serve to give those messages greater credibility and
significance within the movement’s target audience.

First Intifada Documents
The Hamas documents from the First Intifada, its official charter and

series of leaflets, ultimately served to accent each other as counterbalancing and
reinforcing frames. While the charter largely served its purpose as a document

to give an identity to Hamas, its human resources, and its enemies and rivals, the
leaflets succeeded in emphasizing those identities, and in motivating its human

resources and directing them in ways to respond to those identities. Both also
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employed similar alignment and resonance mechanisms and processes. As

such, they warrant a final analysis that reflects their connectivity.
The 1988 Hamas charter and its First Intifada leaflets sets the tone of the
movement’s framing mechanisms and processes for more than a decade after

their release to the Palestinian public. As a new entity in the longstanding Araband Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Hamas needed to strongly establish with its target

audience who it was and was not, its enemies and the injustices brought on by
those enemies, and what Hamas intended to do in order to address those

injustices. Hamas successfully addressed those needs through the extensive
use of identity and agency frame components, frame alignment and resonance
mechanisms and processes, and encapsulating themes that ultimately propelled
Hamas into a leadership role during the Palestinian uprising.

Identity and Agency Frame Components

As a matter of necessity, Hamas needed to distinguish itself from its
enemies and rivals and inform the Palestinian people that it was Muslim,

Palestinian, and a resistance movement. In addition to its highly descriptive

name, Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas used its First Intifada documents to
accomplish its identity goals through multiple references to Islam and Palestine,

and by referring to itself and its human resources as mujahids (freedom fighters)
in its charter and murabitun (defenders of the Islamic frontier) in its leaflets. At
the same time, Hamas identified its enemies as Israel, Zionists, and Jews, while
simultaneously implying that its rivals were secular entities, specifically the PLO
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and Fatah, which had turned their backs on Islam and the Palestinian cause, as
well as the neighboring Arabs who had made peace with its enemy and the West

that supported it. By identifying itself as Muslims loyal to the Palestinian cause,
Hamas was able to enfranchise any Muslims who may have felt marginalized or

dissatisfied by the PLO’s secular nature and potentially tip the scale of influence

over Palestinians to its favor. Such overt and implied terms not only informed
potential human resources who Hamas was, but also who it was not; an
important first step in the identity creation of the new movement and its appeal to

prospective human resources.
The agency components employed in Hamas’s First Intifada documents
lacked the subtlety often used in their use of identity components. The Islamic

movement made it clear, following the ideologies of al-Banna and Qutb, that it
believed that the root of all problems facing the Middle East in general, and the
Palestinian people specifically, was that their leaders had turned their backs on

Islam. As such, Hamas called for the Palestinian people to reject their secular
representatives, the PLO, and to return to a life guided by Islamic principles as
Hamas alleged to represent them. Hamas also overtly and unapologetically
called upon Palestinians to wage Jihad (religious struggle) against its Zionist

enemies. Such a struggle certainly included violence, but also included such
acts as regularly declaring the greatness of God (Allahu akbar) as a statement of
defiance against Israel. Such religiously based forms of agency were not only

110

attacks against the Israeli enemy of Hamas, they were also attacks against its

secular rival.

However, Hamas did not rely upon religion, alone, in its agency rhetoric
and motivation of its human resources. The movement also routinely called for

the education of the Palestinian population on such issues as Islam and the ills of
the Palestinian people at the hands of Israel and the western nations that support

it, as well as strikes and boycotts against Israeli businesses, and protests over
Israeli occupation and aggression. Strikes, boycotts and acts of civil

disobedience were often timed to coincide with important Muslim and Palestinian
dates and holidays, and were routinely called for on dates that contradicted the

same actions recommended by the PLO-based Fatah. Such contradictions
underscored the conflict over influence and leadership of Palestinian human
resources between Hamas and Fatah during the First Intifada as much as they

highlighted the inherent struggle between Hamas and Israel.

The identity and agency components used in Hamas’s First Intifada

documents show that Hamas was just as interested in. targeting the PLO with its
rhetoric as it was in targeting Israel. While there were certainly extensive
rhetorical attacks against Israel in both the charter and leaflets, such attacks
were overt and straightforward. By contrast, the attacks against its secular rivals

were explicit, as well as subtle and implied. By widening its scope of enemies to/
include Israel and the PLO and Fatah, Hamas was able to appeal to a greater
number of people—those who were opposed to Israel and those who were
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dissatisfied with the PLO. Such appeal helped to not only build up Hamas’s base

of influence and pool of human resources; it also decreased the influence and
human resources of its rival. In time, both factors became more and more
important to the long-term viability of Hamas.

Frame Alignment Mechanisms and Processes
While the frame components in Hamas’s First Intifada documents were
often subtle, its use of frame alignment mechanisms and processes in those

documents were anything but. Being a new movement, Hamas had not put out
much material or issued many statements before releasing its First Intifada

documents, so frame transformation was not a factor in those documents.
However, Hamas did employ sparse, yet obvious frame bridging mechanisms,
linking the ideologies of Palestinian nationalism and Islamism, especially in its
charter. Similarly, its sparing use of frame extension is quite overt, with explicit

statements of nationalist support in its charter for the PLO, provided the secular
movement fell in line with the Islamic principles espoused by Hamas. At the
same time, in a non-extension mechanism worth noting, Hamas used its leaflets

to speak out against the PLO-based Fatah, who it claimed was mistreating
Hamas members while both factions were imprisoned with each other.

Yet, these few instances of frame bridging and extension mechanisms
paled in comparison to Hamas’s extensive use of frame amplification

mechanisms in its First Intifada documents. In both its charter and leaflets,
Hamas amplified its frames with references to Islam, passages from the Qur’an,
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and historic events important to Muslims, as well as Palestinians, in general.

Many of its First Intifada documents, including the charter, begin with the
declaration that the messages contained therein were issued in the name of

Allah, and many of the Hamas leaflets from the period were dated with the
traditional western and Islamic calendar systems. By amplifying its frames with
such elements, Hamas was attempting to connect itself, not only with the rich

history of Islam, but also with the vast history of the Palestinian people. Hamas

even went so far as to claim outright, in its charter (1988, p. 124), that it was “a
link in [a long] chain" of history going back to the 1936 conflict between Izz al-Din

al-Qassam and the British and Zionists that occupied Palestine at the time. Such
a connection to religion and history amplified Hamas’s message to its target

audience, and made that message, which may have gone against the values of
some Palestinians, more palatable, resulting in a greater pool of prospective
I

human resources.

Frame Resonance Mechanisms and Processes
The primary frame resonance mechanisms employed Hamas’s First
Intifada documents were its uses of religion, popular wisdom, and credibility. The

documents strategically reminded Palestinians of the centuries of invasions and
injustice they had suffered at the hands of Israel and the West, a history of which
many Palestinians still speak and recount vividly and emotionally over servings of

tea and puffs of tobacco. This use of shared history and popular wisdom by
Hamas told Palestinians that Hamas understood their problems, and, as such,
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knew what it took to solve them. It also displayed a substantial and conscious
effort to get the First Intifada documents to resonate with the Muslim majority of

Palestine. Such efforts certainly served a twofold purpose to both attract human
resources to the Hamas brand, as well as siphon human resources from its

secular rival, Fatah.

Other resonating mechanisms present in the First Intifada documents

were those of relativity and credibility. Hamas was the beneficiary of credibility
through its connection to the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and Hamas’s founder,

Ahmed Yassin. Both the MB and Yassin were known for their social works,
which Hamas had also called for in its documents from the First Intifada. Such
connectivity and motivations showed that Hamas was practicing what it was
preaching, and that the movement understood that Palestinians needed help with

their real world problems. The internal and external claims that Yassin edited

and approved the documents would have only served to enhance their credibility
with those within the Palestinian community who appreciated the works of the
Hamas spiritual, charismatic leader.

Recurring Themes
There were a variety of primary themes used by Hamas to encapsulate
the framing mechanisms and processes the movement employed in its First
Intifada documents. The Hamas charter and leaflets both had ample uses of

Islam as their primary theme. The documents used Islamic passages, histories,

and ideologies to give identity to the movement and to motivate the Muslim
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majority of Palestine. By centering its messages on the theme of Islam, Hamas
was able to get the attention of a target audience that may have felt overlooked

and marginalized by the secular identity of the PLO and Fatah.
While Hamas’s First Intifada documents shared the theme of Islam, they

also employed specific themes not shared. In addition to the primary theme of

Islam, the Hamas charter had secondary themes of obligation and loyalty; each
of which were framed as a part the overarching theme of Islam, as well as being

individual themes. Hamas framed its theme of obligation around the idea that
Palestine was an Islamic waqf (land gift) and, as such, modem Palestinians were
obligated to defend it with acts of jihad, just as it had been defended by the
murabitun and mujahids that came before them. Those within the Islamic

community that were not already attracted to the Islamic themes within the
document were faced with the claim that they were not meeting their religious

obligations. Such a claim would have certainly been a powerful motivator for
potential human resources to join the Hamas cause.
If the question of religious obligation was not enough to encourage

Palestinians to take up the cause for Hamas, the charter also put their loyalty to
Palestine into question. The theme of loyalty within the charter has two facets:
those who should be loyal and those who deserve loyalty. Hamas explained that
Palestinians needed to be loyal to those who were loyal to them. Such a

directive was meant to work for Hamas and against fellow Arabs in Egypt, who
were seen as disloyal for the peace treaty with Israel, as well as secular
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movements that rivaled Hamas. Loyalty was also expected from fellow Muslims
who may have previously given their loyalty to the PLO due to the lack of viable

alternative movements.
The Hamas leaflets from the First Intifada shared the charter’s use of
Islamic themes. In addition to the primary theme of Islam, the leaflets also
employed a secondary theme of resistance. As in the Hamas charter, its leaflets

certainly called upon Palestinians to engage in jihad against their enemies.

However, the resistance called for in the leaflets went further than the

generalized connotations of violence often associated with the term jihad.
Leaflets also encouraged Palestinians to engage in non-violent forms of

resistance and civil disobedience, such as labor strikes, boycotts, and protests
against Israel. The inclusion of non-violent resistance ideas with those of jihad

already present meant that anyone could be involved in resistance against Israel.
Those who sought aggressive and violent forms of resistance were certainly not

discouraged. At the same time, those who may have been disinterested in such

forms of resistance were given an alternative deemed acceptable to Hamas.
This all-encompassing theme of resistance made a place for anyone who sought

to confront Israel, maximizing the potential appeal of Hamas to prospective
human resources.
The other secondary theme employed by Hamas in its First Intifada leaflet

campaign was unity. Palestinians were urged to show their unity by helping each
other through the trying times of the First Intifada. At the same time, Hamas
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encouraged the various Palestinian factions, including its rivals in the PLO and
Fatah, to unify their efforts against their common enemy, rather than against

each other. Of course, as far as Hamas was concerned, unity among Palestinian
factions meant that it was up to others to meet the standards of unity set by

Hamas, as opposed to Hamas altering its standards and unifying with others.
The theme of unity worked well in conjunction with the charter’s theme of loyalty,

and potentially worked against those who disavowed the idea or practice of
working with Hamas. As such, it would have displayed the notion that those

unwilling to come to or work with Hamas were more interested in personal
motivations, rather than in the greater Palestinian effort, and would have been a

powerful appeal to potential human resources.
Conclusions on the First Intifada Documents
The framing mechanisms and processes of Hamas’s First Intifada

documents display a significant effort by the movement to create an identity for
itself and its human resources and to motivate those human resources into

courses of action that would benefit them, as well as Hamas. Yet, the effort was
not only about identifying Hamas and its supporters and sympathizers, it was
also about identifying the entities to which they were, and should be opposed.

Hamas and its human resources were loyal Palestinian Muslims who were
unified in their struggle against Israel and those who had turned their back on
Islam. These ideas were reinforced with frame alignment mechanisms designed

to help Hamas’s message resonate deeply with its target audience, and the
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relative lack of frame extension shows that there was little place within Hamas’s
pool of potential human resources for those who did not fit into the finely-focused

identity Hamas was attempting to create at that time. Such a lack of inclusion did
not appear to have hurt the long-term viability of Hamas as a resistance
movement. Instead, it bred a largely cohesive, hard-lined group of human
resources who were often willing to go to extreme measures for the movement

and its cause.

Electoral Platform
The 2006 electoral platform of Hamas saw a complete makeover of its

framing mechanisms and processes from those of its 1988 charter and First
Intifada leaflets. The motivations driving those frames, however, did not change.

While Hamas stayed relatively true to its statements of resistance against its

enemy, Israel, it also stayed true to its resistance against its political rival, Fatah.
What changed was the ways in which it presented itself and its opposition to
those entities to which it opposed, and the forms of agency through which it
sought to bring such change.

Identity and Agency Components

There was a major shift in the ways Hamas used identity components in
its electoral platform from the ways the movement used them in its First Intifada

documents. The most notable shift was in the naming of the Hamas political
party. Hamas did not enter the formal political arena under the moniker of
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“Hamas.” Rather, it did so under the name “List of Change and Reform.” This
alteration was not an attempt at political trickery or to make the electorate believe

the party was something that it was not. Surely, every Palestinian who supported
the List was well aware to whom they were lending their support. The change
was not about renaming Hamas, but about adding a new identity to the

movement. The traditional Hamas, in name and in action, still existed. The List

of Change and Reform simply added another layer to it. And with that added
layer of identity came an increased target audience and an increase in potential
human resources.
However, Hamas made more identity changes in 2006 than simply naming
its political party. The group also altered the identity components it used within
its party platform. True to Hamas form, terms such as “Palestinian,” “Muslim,"

and “Islam” were sprinkled throughout the document. Yet, there was a notable
absence of a prior identity mainstay of Hamas—the term “mujahid” The Arabic

term, roughly translated to “freedom fighter,” was replaced by the repeated term
of “citizen.” Such a change signifies a major shift in the way Hamas wanted the
Palestinian electorate to identify with its political party and its human resources.

No longer was Hamas to be seen as simple freedom fighters identified, identified
with terminology that gave rise to mental images of armed masked men. Rather,

Hamas and its human resources were to be seen as concerned citizens, seeking

a positive, democratic, and legitimate change to the socio-political and economic
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landscape of Palestine. This shift certainly brought a good deal of increased

legitimacy to the movement, as well as to the idea of being a part of it
There was also a marked shift in the identity components Hamas used in
its 2006 electoral platform to identify those to whom it opposed. Terms such as
“Israel” and “Zionists," liberally used in its First Intifada documents, were sparsely

used in its electoral document Furthermore, the term “Jews,” “Fatah,” and “PLO”

were not used in the document, at all. It was not that Hamas no longer saw
those entities as an enemy or rival, it simply gave them different names—
“occupation” and "corruption.” By focusing less on who its enemies were, and,

instead focusing on what its enemies did, Hamas attempted to increase the
legitimacy of its political rhetoric, and, in turn increase its legitimacy with its
potential and existing human resources.
Once Hamas redefined itself and its enemies, it needed to redefine what

needed to be done to rectify the problems those enemies had caused. As such,
with new framing components of identity came new frame components of

agency. Like the First Intifada documents, the electoral platform called for a

return to Islamic principles, resistance against and liberation from Israeli

aggression and occupation, and the education of the Palestinian people. The
2006 document, however, added a new form of agency to the rhetorical arsenal

of Hamas—“reform.” Hamas recognized that it would not be enough to simply

identify itself as potential reformers of what it labeled as a corrupt Palestinian
system of government, but that it also needed to propose and articulate real
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reforms to that system. The movement called for wide-ranging, Islamic and non-

Islamic reforms in both the domestic and foreign policy sectors that included the
increasing of public liberties, executive, legislative, and judicial reforms, and

renewed examinations of existing alliances. Hamas also altered the wording of
its past calls for Jihad against Israel, opting, instead, to state that it reserved the
right to use any means against Israeli occupation. These shifts in tone and

wording from previous documents shows that Hamas wanted to appeal to a
wider range of people, while still attempting to hold true to the positions that
attracted its original base of human resources. Calls for jihad and a return to

Islam may have been enough to create and maintain a resistance movement, but

they were not enough to create and maintain a viable political party. What
attracted a particular type of Muslim to resistance against Israel might not be
enough to attract other Muslims to vote for Hamas. And it certainly would not be

effective at bringing any non-Muslims to support it. Hamas seemed to sense that
potential problem and successfully addressed it with its marked shift in agency

components, widening its target audience and pool of potential human resources,
while also staying true to its existing human resources.

Frame Alignment Mechanisms and Processes
The shifts in Hamas’s framing mechanisms and processes in its 2006

electoral platform were not limited to identity and agency components. There
were also major alterations to its frame alignment strategies. The document
contained a fair amount of Hamas’s usual Islamic frame amplification, beginning
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the text with a passage from the Qur’an, while sprinkling other Qur’anic passages
throughout its pages. Also present were its typical emotive phrasings, designed

to tug at the heartstrings of the Palestinian electorate. There were, however,
frame alignment mechanisms and processes in the document that were not part

of Hamas’s traditional rhetorical repertories. Hamas integrated into its platform
frames that bridged ideas such as religion and law, individual and collective
rights, and family and society, which were not as prevalent in its First Intifada

documents. Similarly, its electoral platform employed frame extension
mechanisms that included Christians in frames that were once only intended to

align with the sensibilities of Muslims. Yet, the most significant change in
Hamas’s frame alignment strategy was its uses of frame transformation. Such
changes were relatively subtle and implied, resting on the fact that Hamas, who

had once been outspoken against participation in the formal political process was
releasing a document intended to bolster its standing within such a process. The

subtlety of those changes, however, did not take away from their notable

inclusion, and were likely noticed by the potential and existing human resources

who were ready for Hamas to enter the political arena.
The significant adjustment in Hamas’s frame alignment mechanisms and

processes signifies the fact that the movement was aware that a change in

alignment strategies was required to take it from a resistance movement to a
political party. In order to take on its politically established and entrenched rival

on the virtual battlefield of democracy, Hamas had to maximize the amount of
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human resources to which it was aligning its message. Every Palestinian,

regardless of religious affiliation or socio-political ideology, became the target
audience of the movement, and Hamas’s frame alignment strategies reflected

that ideal.

Frame Resonance Mechanisms and Processes
The frame resonance mechanisms and processes employed by Hamas in

its electoral platform were not much different from those used in its First Intifada

documents. Like those previous documents, the electoral platform relied on the
credibility of Hamas and the relativity of the message the movement was relaying

to the public. While Hamas continued to maintain its religious credibility through
the use of Islamic passages and ideas, by 2006 Hamas could no longer rely on
the inherent credibility of its charismatic spiritual leader, Ahmed Yassin, who was

assassinated by an Israeli airstrike 2 years prior. Instead, Hamas borrowed the

resonance strategies that had worked so well in its First Intifada leaflet campaign,

gaining credibility by attacking the credibility of its rival. Further credibility was
surely gained by the decades of social services that had been provided to the
Palestinian people by Hamas. Hamas had a history of not only recognizing many

of the problems facing Palestinians, it also had a rich history of doing something
about them. Such a boost to the credibility of the movement also served to

enhance the relativity mechanism that affects frame resonance, as did the
exploitation of popular opinion regarding the corruption of the existing Palestinian

government.
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However, messages cannot resonate with an audience if there is no
audience to hear them. And perhaps the most significant factor that affected the

resonance of Hamas’s 2006 frames was that of diffusion and the widening of
Hamas’s target audience. During the years of the First Intifada, Hamas was
reliant on the word of mouth by religious leaders in its sponsored mosques and

people on the street who told each other of the deeds and words of the
movement, and on a rudimentary leaflet campaign in order to disseminate its

message to a relatively limited target audience. By 2006, the movement had

combined those factors with control of mass media outlets and the benefit of the
Internet, allowing it to spread its message around the globe. People did not have

to wait for Hamas’s message to find them, they could actively seek out that
message and consume it at will. By expanding its target audience, Hamas was

able to expand its pool of potential human resources.

Recurring Themes
Three primary and secondary themes encapsulated Hamas’s 2006
framing mechanisms and processes. The most obvious theme, as its party name

suggested, was that of reform. Hamas made it clear in nearly every paragraph
that its chief motivation was to reform the socio-political, economic, and cultural

landscape of Palestine. Next, Hamas pushed the theme of national unity. As it
had done in its First intifada leaflets, the movement encouraged Palestinians to
stick together during trying times. The difference between 2006 and the years

during the First Intifada was that in 2006 it was encouraging unity as citizens of a
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nation, rather than as the people of a resistance movement. But the
overwhelming theme present in the 2006 electoral platform was populism.
Hamas played upon the populist sentiment that the Palestinian National Authority

was sick with the disease of corruption, and that Hamas was the cure for the ills

of the nation. As was witnessed by its stunning victory in the 2006 Palestinian
Legislative elections, Hamas’s themes played well with the Palestinian
electorate, and were certainly helpful in obtaining and maintaining human

resources.

Conclusions on the 2006 Electoral Platform
Hamas altered its use of collective action framing mechanisms and

processes in its 2006 electoral platform because its needs and motivations had
changed from the days ofthe Fist Intifada decades earlier. The movement was
transforming from a sheer resistance movement to a viable political movement

and needed to disseminate a pragmatic message that reflected that change to its

potential and existing human resources. At the same time, Hamas needed to

stay relatively true to its previous frames so that it would not alienate the human
resources that came to and remained in the movement because of its prior

messaging. In the end, Hamas seemingly found a balance in its electoral
platform between satisfying its existing base of human resources, while also
maximizing its appeal to new human resources.
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Conclusions
The analysis performed in this research clearly shows that Hamas

employs all of the framing mechanisms and processes available to social
movement entrepreneurs. It uses identity and motivational agency components,
it uses various frame alignment and resonant mechanisms and processes, and it

encapsulates those mechanisms and processes into themes that keep the
movement on message. With that stated, however, this research also shows that

Hamas utilizes those mechanisms and processes in different ways, depending

on its needs at the time. As a new resistance movement introducing itself to the
world at the start of the First Intifada, Hamas needed to build its initial base of

human resources. It did so by writing resonant documents that aligned the
movement’s message to the ideologies of its target audience, while

simultaneously identifying itself as a viable alternative to its well-established
rivals and providing direction and motivation to its fast-growing pool of human

resources. Once Hamas had firmly established itself as major player in the

greater Palestinian-Israeli conflict and decided to make the move into the arena
of formal politics, it needed to re-introduce itself and expand its base of existing
human resources in order to meet the needs of a major player in the democratic

process. It met that challenge by altering its identity, agency, alignment, and
resonance strategies, ultimately making the movement and its message more
acceptable to a greater number of people. This change in messaging shows a

pragmatic willingness by Hamas to risk sacrificing a portion of its hard-lined
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human resources in order to appeal to a larger target audience—a gamble that
appears to have paid off for the controversial and complicated movement, at
least through 2006.

However, the history of Hamas goes well beyond the First Intifada of the
1980s and its stunning victory in the 2006 Palestinian Legislative elections. The
years up to and including the Second Intifada, that began in 2000, saw the

emergence of a much more organized and violent movement, posing new
messaging and human resource challenges for the movement. Similarly, its
takeover of the Gaza Strip following the 2006 elections and subsequent war with

Fatah over control of that contested piece of land transformed the movement

from a political party to the sole administrators of an area that houses more than

one and a half million people. While these critical periods of Hamas history were
not included within the scope of this research, future researchers are encouraged

to acquire a working knowledge of them and to use that knowledge, in
conjunction with critical analysis of its documents, to analyze the framing

mechanisms and processes Hamas employed to meet its human resource needs
of those periods. By gaining a more complete understanding of the ways Hamas
attracts and maintains its human resources, we not only gain an understanding of
what truly motivates this complex, multi-faceted movement, we also gain an

understanding of what motivates those who join, support and sympathize with it.

As Hamas does not appear to be losing its overall influence in the Palestinian-
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Israeli conflict, such understandings are a crucial component in bringing an

eventual peace to a region that has seen violence and heartache for far too long.
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